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Maternal and child health services favor the wealthiest in lower and middle income 
countries.  Debate about the potential of performance-based financing (PBF) to address these 
disparities continues. As PBF is adopted by other countries, it is critical to understand the equity 
effects for primary health care services.  The aim of this dissertation is to evaluate the effects of 
PBF on equity in maternal and child health service use when no specific provisions target the 
poorest in the population.   
In Rwanda, PBF was designed to increase health service use and improve quality of 
services provided. Paired districts were randomly assigned to intervention and control for PBF 
implementation. Using Rwanda’s Demographic Health Survey data from 2005 (pre-intervention) 
and 2007-08 (post-intervention), cluster-level panel datasets of 7,899 women 15-49 years of age 
and 5,781 children 0-59 months living in intervention and control districts were created.  A 
difference-in-differences estimation strategy was used to evaluate the program impact of PBF on 
select primary maternal and child health service outcomes.   Interaction terms between wealth 
quintiles and PBF were estimated to identify the differential effect of PBF among women and 
children from poorer households.     
Health service use for women and children increased for intervention and control 
populations and across all wealth quintiles from 2005 to 2007.  The probability of a facility 
delivery, the most incentivized service, was significantly higher in PBF districts, while no effect 
of PBF was found for ANC visits, contraceptive use, or care-seeking for childhood illness.  No 
evidence that PBF was a pro-poor or a pro-rich strategy for increasing access was found.  
iv 
 
Treatment received for childhood illnesses, however, significantly improved for children in PBF 
districts, and data suggests that poorer children benefited more.   
These results indicate that PBF may be an effective strategy for increasing access when 
use is uniformly low and a service is well incentivized; but PBF will do little to alleviate 
disparities in service use.   The larger effect of PBF on quality of services, which remains within 
the control of the facility and provider, suggests that PBF does positively impact health care 
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In Rwanda, considerable improvements have been reported for select maternal and child 
health indicators, including higher contraceptive prevalence, earlier use of antenatal care (ANC), 
more facility versus home births, increased childhood immunization coverage, and increased 
care-seeking for ill children.
1-3
  These indicators collectively point to improved use of health 
services, yet give little illumination about why service use has increased.  Moreover, an inequity 
in service use between the richest and the poorest has been noted.
3
   
In 2005, Rwanda formally adopted a national performance-based financing (PBF) 
initiative to increase health care worker productivity and quality of services provided at hospitals 
and health centers.
4
  This dissertation seeks to determine whether a PBF program, without equity 
targets, can differentially impact the use of select, preventive and curative health care services 
among the poorest women and children in Rwanda.   
 
Maternal and Child Health 
Maternal and child survival continue to improve globally, yet many countries will not 
meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015.    In September 2000, the 
international community committed to reducing maternal mortality by three quarters (MDG 5) 
from 1990 to 2015.
5
  As 2015 rapidly approaches, assessments of progress towards this goal have 
found that the majority of countries in sub-Saharan Africa are not on track.
6-9
  The United Nations 
(UN) reported only a 26% decrease in the maternal mortality ratio (MMR) from 870 deaths per 





Childhood mortality has also declined globally in the past 20 years to 60 deaths per 1,000 live 
births in 2009, yet the possibility of meeting the targeted two-thirds reduction for MDG 4 remains 
elusive.
10
  In sub-Saharan Africa where pneumonia, diarrhea, and malaria remain the leading 
killers for children under five, the mortality rate remains twice that of the global average.
10
  
Particularly vulnerable are children from the poorest households who are 80% more likely to die 
in the first five years of life compared to children from the wealthiest households.
10
 
In Rwanda, progress in meeting the MDGs historically has not been consistent or 
adequate, yet remarkable progress has been made in the past decade.  The maternal mortality rate 
was declining prior to the 1994 genocide, reversed itself during the war years, before starting to 
decline again after 2000.
10
  Maternal mortality rose from 1,100 deaths per 100,000 live births in 
1990 to 1,400 in 1995 then dropped to a new low of 540 in 2008, marking a 50.9% decrease from 
1990 to 2008.
10
   
Service indicators for maternal health in Rwanda have shown remarkable improvements 
in the past decade.  The latest Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) reports an improvement in 
facility deliveries from 28% in 2005 to 69% in 2010.
3
  Similarly modern contraceptive use among 
married women increased dramatically from 10% in 2005 to 45% in 2010.
3
  The equity gap in 
maternal service use has also improved since 2005, when a 50 percentage point difference in 
facility deliveries existed between the poorest and least poor wealth quintile.  This gap closed to 
29 percentage points in 2007. 
2
  A parallel trend was seen for modern contraceptive use with only 
a 7 percentage point gap in 2007, down from 21 percentage points in 2005.
2
   Efforts that 
contributed to this closing of the equity gap have been suggested but not rigorously examined. 
Rwanda has made considerable progress in their efforts to improve child survival post-
wartime when mortality fell precipitously from 186 under-five mortality rate in 2000 to 112 
under-five mortality rate in 2008.
7
  As of 2006, Bryce et al. estimated that Rwanda would need to 
maintain an annual 11% reduction in child mortality from 2007 to 2015 in order to achieve MDG 
4.
9
   According to the 2010 Rwanda Demographic Health Survey (RDHS), the under-five 
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mortality rate has declined by 50% since the 2005 RDHS, which may put Rwanda within striking 
distance of the 2015 target.  Unfortunately this improved child survival is not uniform across 
Rwanda.  In an equity analysis of childhood illness and mortality, the poorest quintile of 
households had a 58% higher infant mortality rate, a 60% higher under-five mortality rate, and 
over 40% higher prevalence of fever, diarrhea and acute respiratory infections compared to the 
least poor 20% of  households.
11
  Moreover, the rate of severe stunting and severe underweight 
status among children was twice as high among the poorest compared to the least poor.
11
  Review 
of data from repeated DHS in Rwanda confirm this pattern of disparate health outcomes, with 
wealth quintiles inversely associated with morbidity.
12-14
   The exception to this trend was 
reported by Hong et al. who found that wealth was not predictive of childhood mortality in a 
pooled dataset from four DHS spanning 1992-2007; however, wealth status was grouped in 
terciles rather than quintiles without stratification by rural residence, which may have masked 
some of the differences, and the period reviewed included the war years which may also have 
affected findings.
15
   
Jones and colleagues in 2003, evaluated the potential impact of multiple preventive and 
curative child survival interventions.
16
  Based on this work, Bryce and colleagues assessed 
individual country coverage of eight of these interventions deemed to have “the highest potential 
impact on child mortality” if universal coverage is achieved.17  For Rwanda, measles and DPT 
immunization, vitamin A supplementation and use of insecticide-treated bednets were found to be 
on track in 2007-08; use of a skilled birth attendant and oral rehydration therapy (ORT) were 
increasingly common but continued to require monitoring; while care-seeking for pneumonia and 
antimalarial treatment received had achieved less than 30% coverage, well below that needed to 
reduce mortality rates.
14, 17
   
Preventive efforts such as immunizations, vitamin A supplements, and distribution of 
treated bednets, benefit from national campaigns that universally target vulnerable populations.  
Many curative interventions rely on formal health services offered through health facilities 
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responding to acute needs.  The success of facility-based interventions, such as Safe Motherhood 
Programs or Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses (IMCI), requires a base level of 
service use to have a measurable effect.
18
     
 
Equity in Health and Health Service Use 
The overarching intent of the complete set of MDGs is to improve the life circumstances 
of the poor; however, the health-specific MDGs obscure this focus by monitoring national 
changes in health status rather than the differential changes for the poorest.
19-21
  Development of 
the health-specific MDGs – reduction in child mortality, maternal mortality, and infectious 
disease incidence – was based on the assumption that public health spending on programs that 
target “diseases of the poor” will primarily benefit the poor.22  Yet assessments of MDG progress 
have demonstrated that countries can continue to improve their MDG indicators through 
advancements primarily among the wealthier population while notably not improving the health 
status of the poorest among them.
23, 24
  In a multi-country analysis of child mortality, Gwatkin and 
colleagues found that the under-five mortality rate was 70% lower among the wealthiest 
compared to the poorest in sub-Saharan Africa.
19
  Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers required for 
heavily indebted poor countries to qualify for debt relief from the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund are similarly devoid of health strategies that focus exclusively on the poor.
25, 26
 
The World Development Report 2004 found countries failed to adequately allocate health 
resources to the poor, rather the wealthiest received the largest proportion of benefits.
26
   
The poorest of the population need intentional health services because they remain at 
higher risk for morbidity and mortality.  Women and children from poorer families have higher 
exposure to communicable and chronic diseases due to inadequate sanitation, insufficient 
drinking water, poor housing, and poor air quality, coupled with diminished resistance to disease 
due to malnutrition and micro-nutrient deficiencies.
27
  Exacerbating this problem, health facilities 
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located in poorer communities are frequently understaffed, poorly equipped, and less well 
organized, resulting in health services less responsive to the needs of the population.
27
   
Primary maternal and child health services continue to favor the wealthiest in lower and 
middle income countries.     Use of health services and particularly adoption of new health 
interventions typically follow Rogers Theory of Diffusion of Innovations, with the wealthy 
adopting services first.
28
  The “inverse care law” proposed by Tudor-Hart 29 and added to by 
Victora and colleagues,
30
 take it a step further advocating that health services benefit those who 
least need them which exacerbates health inequities between the richest and poorest.  Not until 
the richest have maximized the potential benefit of the intervention, will the benefits trickle down 
to the poorest among them.
30
  The poorer among the population often face more limited choices 
for services, require more education about the value of services, and face other economic 
priorities that compete for their limited time and resources.   Even programs developed 
specifically to reach the poorest populations, such as oral rehydration therapy, were still more 
likely to reach those with greater economic resources, albeit in a less pro-rich manner than 
general health services.
31, 32
  The Countdown 2015 report found that uniform, simple preventive 
services with vertical implementation, such as immunizations and treated bednets, were more 
equitably consumed compared to curative services such as treatment of malaria and diarrhea, and 
services that required access to 24-hour clinical care such as deliveries.
9
  Castro-Leal and 
colleagues reported similar findings from a multi-country analysis in Africa, where curative care 
services favor the wealthy compared to preventive care services.
33
   
Wealth has been significantly associated with maternal and child health service 
utilization in numerous African and Southeast Asian countries.
34-40
  Boerma and colleagues in an 
analysis of 54 countries calculated the gap between maximum use of services and actual use of 
services.  They found that the largest gap in services provision was for family planning, maternal 
and newborn care, and treatment of ill children.
41
  The largest equity gap in service provision, that 
is the largest difference in service use between the wealthiest and the poorest, was for skilled 
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delivery, 33.9% difference in use, and antenatal care, 21.1% difference.
41
  In Rwanda, the use of 
health services and the adoption of maternal and child health interventions such as modern 
contraceptives, skilled deliveries, child and adult immunizations, as well as seeking skilled care 
for childhood illnesses, dropped or remained dangerously low in the years preceding and 
following the war.
42, 43
  By 2000, according to Boerma’s analysis, the combined gap in service 
provision for maternal and child health services was 51.7% and declined slightly to 46.9% in 
2005; still almost half of the population was not receiving primary maternal and child health 
services.
41
  By 2005, the wealthiest, on average, used health services at a rate 16.3% higher than 
the poorest.  This analysis of DHS data provides evidence of “top inequity” in Rwanda, 
essentially evidence of some parallel trends in service use by wealth quintile, except among the 
very wealthiest who show a sharp increase in service use.
41
 
The inequity in service utilization between the poorest and the less poor highlights the 
need to develop interventions to reach the poor.  Health interventions need to motivate the poor 
households to seek services or encourage the providers to reach out to those populations.
44
  
Approaches range from targeting the individual to addressing the health infrastructure, and 
multiple approaches are needed.  Moreover, every intervention developed, whether with or 
without a specific equity focus, should be evaluated for its impact on equity.
27
  Without continued 
attention on the equitable distribution and uptake of health services, the poorest will remain at a 
disadvantage. 
 
Rwanda’s Health Reforms 
Rwanda has undertaken a set of national health reforms over the past several years with 
evidence of improving health status nationally; however, it remains unclear whether these 
reforms have differentially affected the poor.   The health system infrastructure, both facilities 
and human resources, was severely harmed during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.  Afterwards, 
extensive donor aid flooded the country to rebuild facilities and reestablish training programs.  By 
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2005, approximately 60% of the total population lived within 5 kilometers of a health facility and 
85% lived within 10 kilometers;
4
 as of 2007, total government spending on health was 
approximately $12-14 per person; yet health staffing fell below international standards with many 
districts supporting only two doctors per 100,000 population.
45
  A series of health sector reforms 
were adopted in the mid-2000s to improve provision and access to primary care services, 
including decentralization, coordination of donor aid, performance-based financing, and 
community-based health insurance.   
The Government of Rwanda (GoR) adopted of a policy of decentralization in 2005, 
which was the prelude to substantial changes to the structure and autonomy of the public health 
sector in Rwanda.  The aim of decentralization was to empower local administrative bodies to 
take on a leadership role in the administration and decision-making for local services, including 
health, education, and economic activities.  In 2006, 30 new administrative districts replaced the 
former 106 health districts.  These new districts were tasked with operations for all development 
areas and were encouraged to work with communities in a more proactive decision-making role.
46
  
Each new administrative district included at least one district hospital and multiple health centers 
and health posts that fed referrals to the district hospital.   
Meanwhile, the GoR established a financial framework to actively manage and 
coordinate the donor funds supporting the health system.
47
  The GoR determined that it was in the 
best interest of Rwanda to have a strong, central voice in directing funds towards government-
supported health priorities while minimizing duplication when possible.
47
 
In the context of these reforms, two financing strategies were implemented to maximize 
health facility productivity and use.  In 2005, following 3 pilot projects, the GoR adopted a 
national performance-based financing (PBF) program for health centers and hospitals.  This 
financing program was designed to incentivize providers and facility personnel to increase health 
service productivity and improve service quality through special contracting at the facility-level.  
To facilitate increased use by the consumer, a national health insurance law was adopted in 2006, 
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requiring households to purchase health insurance, largely through a community-based health 
insurance (CBHI) program, or Mutuelle de Santé.  Mutuelles were developed in an effort to 
mobilize resources locally for health centers and to reduce the financial barriers and risks families 
faced with unexpected medical costs.  Mutuelle benefits are decided by a local health committee 
and cover a standard set of primary health care services, such as family planning, antenatal care, 
deliveries, consultations, lab work and generic drugs.  Participation requires an enrollment fee 
and annual premium, with the poorest in the village, as decided by the village committee, eligible 
for donor subsidies to cover the premiums.  By 2006, 73% of the population reported 
participation in a Mutuelle.
47
   
The adoption of PBF in Rwanda has been closely watched to determine whether this type 
of funding strategy can positively impact service use in a lower income country.  The evidence 
for increased use of preventive services is mounting; however, the effects on use of curative care 
and overall equity in access have not been scrutinized.      
 
Performance-Based Financing 
Performance-based financing, results-based financing, pay-for-performance, and output-
based financing are a sample of the multiple names for health financing strategies that specify the 
transfer of money or goods in exchange for a measurable action or performance target.
48
  These 
financing strategies focus on demand-side incentives for service consumers or supply-side 
incentives for service providers.
44, 48, 49
  Demand-side incentives can include conditional cash 
transfers or vouchers, which incentivize individuals to seek specific preventive or curative care.  
Supply-side incentives, such as salary supplements, assume that appropriate monetary incentives 
will increase output, improve quality, and ultimately improve health outcomes.
50
  PBF is a type of 
results-based financing that uses only supply-side financial incentives for select quality services.
49
  
This results financing was described by Meessen and colleagues as “a mechanism by which 
health providers are, at least partially, funded on the basis of their performance...contrasted with 
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the line-item approach, which finances a health facility through the provision of inputs (e.g., 
drugs, personnel).”51(p.153)   
PBF models are attracting attention as donors and governments look towards innovative 
ways to meet the 2015 MDGs.  While PBF models vary by objective, health system and country 
setting, they can loosely be grouped by type of contracting mechanism:  a) between international 
donor and national government; b) between government or donor and private contractor; or c) 
between national and local governments.
52, 53
  Donors such as the Global Alliance for Vaccines 
and Immunization (GAVI) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, expect 
measurable results for the aid provided, tying subsequent funds to demonstrated improvements 
such as immunization coverage rates or bednet distribution.
53
  Examples of contracting within 
middle and low income countries include private or NGO contracting in Haiti, Guatemala, 
Afghanistan, India, Bangladesh and Cambodia; as well as contracting within the public sector or 
between the levels of government, notably in Rwanda, Brazil, Egypt and more recently in 
Burundi and Tanzania.
50, 52-57
  The common thread among these models is the contracting 
mechanism that ties funding to performance in an effort to solve the principal-agent problem.
52
  
Essentially the principal-agent problem arises when the principal or contracting party wants the 
agent or contractor to perform in a certain manner but the separation of the two may lead the 
contractor to act in their own best interest.  The contracting mechanism then needs to include 
appropriate monitoring and incentives to achieve the desired result.   PBF contracts are designed 
to motivate the agent, in this case the health facility or provider, to meet a set of measurable 
performance indicators that the principal or funder can easily and accurately monitor.
48, 52, 58
  
Despite the different models and settings, the goal of PBF across countries is more similar than 
different:  to increase the availability and use of quality maternal and child health services.  As 
noted by Canavan and colleagues, the MCH indicators used to track and reward performance 
across PBF contracts consistently include contraceptive adoption and continuation, ANC use, 
facility deliveries, immunizations and curative care.
50
  Some contracts focus almost exclusively 
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on process measures such as immunization coverage rates in Haiti 
59
 or number of facility 
deliveries in Cambodia
60
, while other models explicitly reward quality of care as in the case of 
Rwanda, Burundi and Egypt.
56, 57, 61, 62
   
Improvements in facility outputs and quality for incentivized services have been reported 
by numerous projects but few have included appropriately designated control sites that allow for 
robust comparisons.
48, 52, 60, 63
  Several evaluations of PBF projects have reported increased 
productivity, as measured by increased number of facility deliveries, immunizations given, family 
planning consultations and/or new contraceptive adopters, curative consults, etc.
54, 55, 64
  Many of 
these evaluations have design constraints that weaken their findings.  First, some of the 
evaluations have relied exclusively on health information system data reported by facilities that 
are incentivized to improve their reporting.
57, 59, 60, 63-65
   Second, a number of studies examine 
changes only in PBF sites, with no comparison group or means of controlling for changes in the 
health environment that may influence uptake of services.
57, 64
  Lastly, in an effort to tease out the 
effect of PBF from other concurrent changes, some studies have identified control sites, however, 
frequently these comparison groups are convenience samples and rarely are the intervention and 
control site assignments randomized.  While there are analytic techniques available to surmount 
this lack of randomization, none of the studies reviewed employed these, instead trend 
comparisons dominate the literature.
65, 66
  Notable exceptions include the experimental designs 
employed for the scale-up in PBF in Rwanda
61
, the comparison of contracting methods in 
Cambodia
60
, and the pilot project in Egypt.
56
   
Rwanda was one of the first countries in sub-Saharan Africa to experiment with PBF.  
From 2002 to 2005, three PBF pilot projects covering approximately 2.6 million people (~32%) 
were implemented in Rwanda.  Known as the Performance Initiative, these projects were 
designed to reverse a disturbing trend of decreasing health service utilization.  User fees, initially 
abolished following the war, were reintroduced locally in the late 1990’s to provide some 





  By 2001, cost-sharing at the local level accounted for 60-80% of a facility’s revenues, 
placing the lion’s share of the funding on the population.66  Many could not afford the new user 
fees and use of public health services dropped precipitously.
63, 66, 67
  The fixed salaries and 
standard bonus payment system for health providers, meanwhile, provided no financial incentive 
to maximize productivity or extend the reach of services to the populations in need.
63, 67
  The 
Performance Initiative was designed to incentivize providers to increase productivity within the 
public health system; quality of services was not part of the pilot payment scheme.   
Evaluations of Rwanda’s pilot projects’ influence on increased productivity were 
promising.  From 2001 to 2004, Meessen and colleagues reported dramatic increases in facility 
deliveries, family planning adoption, and tetanus toxoid delivery to pregnant women served by 
health centers in two pilot districts, Gakoma and Kabutare, compared to far less dramatic changes 
in health centers outside the pilot districts.
67
  Corroborating these findings, Rusa and colleagues 
compared service use before and after pilot implementation and found increased uptake of family 
planning, facility deliveries, and measles immunization from health centers in contracting 
districts compared to non-contracting districts.
63
   However, neither of these evaluations was able 
to isolate the impact of the Performance Initiative from pre-existing conditions at the intervention 
sites nor from other national reform efforts underway.  Specifically, the pilot districts were not 
randomly selected, rather there were features in place that created a promising environment for 
intervention, including upgraded facilities with adequate supplies and equipment, a track record 
of public use indicating access to and acceptance of the health system, a functioning health 
information system, and involvement by foreign aid groups that set the stage for a new broad 
reaching intervention.
63, 67
  The features that led to program placement likely introduced 
endogeneity which was not controlled for in the evaluations.  Additionally, national efforts to 
decrease demand-side barriers, such as community-based insurance programs, equity funds for 
the poor and local inputs from community groups, were not controlled for in basic comparisons of 
percent increase in service use.  Lastly, data from the facilities’ health information systems were 
12 
 
used to evaluate changes in service utilization.  This was the primary source of data used to 
calculate incentive payments thus intensive capacity building efforts focused on improving the 
information systems in the pilot districts, without comparable efforts made in the non-contracting 
districts.   It is not unreasonable to expect that an incentive based on reporting of services 
provided will increase the completeness of reporting and, some would argue, the inflation of 
reporting.  Although independent surveys by the School of Public Health in Rwanda did validate 
the reported data from the intervention sites
67
, qualitative interviews in one district following 
national expansion, revealed some evidence of inflated reporting.
58
 
In 2005, PBF was adopted by Rwanda as a national health financing strategy.  Based on 
lessons learned from the pilot PBF projects, the GoR defined a universal set of 14 process 
indicators, 9 quality weights and an algorithm for determining facility incentive payments based 
on indicator performance and weighted by quality of care measured across 14 different services 
(see Appendix A.1 for complete list of indicators, payments and weights).
61, 63
  An additional set 
of indicators were specifically adopted for district hospitals and for HIV services as detailed 
elsewhere.
68
  The accompanying capacity needed to manage PBF at the district level, such as 
health reporting systems, contract management services, assessment tools and supervisory 
structures, were identified.  Finally, the decision to evaluate the impact of PBF on health service 
utilization and quality was made prior to scale-up, resulting in a phased implementation approach 
designed for evaluation.  In collaboration with researchers from the School of Public Health, the 
Ministry of Health, and the World Bank, districts not involved in the pilot projects were matched 
on population density, rainfall and livelihood.  Matched districts were then randomly assigned to 
Phase 1 or Phase 2.  Phase 1 districts (n=12) transitioned to PBF models between January 2006 
and November 2007, with the first PBF payment in June 2006.  Phase 2 districts (n=7) began 
transitioning in April 2008.  The remaining 11 pilot districts transitioned to the national program 
during Phase 1 but were not included in the subsequent evaluation.  This phased implementation 
supported a more rigorous impact evaluation that controlled for program placement and 
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effectively designated matched districts as the counterfactual, allowing for comparisons between 
what did happen in implementation districts and what might have happened in these sites if the 
program had not been implemented.
61
  
For the impact evaluation, data were collected on use of maternal and child health 
services from household surveys and client exit interviews in a pre-post evaluation design.  
Quality of ANC services was measured in the household survey by maternal receipt of tetanus 
toxoid while assessment of quality at the facility relied on the quality index measure developed 
per GoR clinical protocols and used to determine payment.  Increased input-based funding was 
provided to the control sites in an effort to determine the impact of incentive-based payments on 
service productivity and quality compared to a lump sum general budget increase.    A difference-
in-differences analysis controlling for facility fixed effects as well as individual and household 
covariates was used to estimate changes in service use attributable to the PBF program.   Basinga 
and Gertler found a compelling 23% increase in use of facility deliveries, and an increase in use 
of child preventive care visits for both young children (56% for 0-23 month olds) and older 
children (132% for 24-59 month olds), yet no differences were found in number of ANC visits or 
in childhood immunization uptake.
61
  The quality of ANC care provided at intervention sites was 
found to be significantly higher compared to control sites despite no difference in knowledge and 




Basinga and Gertler posit that incentive-based payments have a positive effect on 
services most incentivized and where providers exert more control, such as quality of services 
rendered at a visit, compared to outcomes that require repeat initiative by the client to seek out 
services, for example multiple ANC visits or childhood immunizations.    Per the schedule of 
output indicators and quality weights, facility deliveries and obstetric referrals are the most highly 
incentivized services and the quality of prenatal services along with the quality of facility 
deliveries account for over 25% of the total quality score.  Selective outreach to pregnant women 
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for a one-time delivery and attention to quality for these services can reap large benefits for health 
centers and providers.  Childhood immunizations on the other hand, require repeat visits by the 
client yet incentives are only awarded for completion of the recommended full schedule rather 
than for each shot administered.  The quality weight for immunizations accounts for less than 
10% of the total facility weight and the payment for a completed schedule is less than a 
dollar.(Appendix A.1)    Family planning services are well incentivized for new adopters ($1.83) 
and account for 11% of the quality score, however evaluations have shown mixed results for use 
and no assessment of quality.
62, 63, 67
  Curative care visits have low per-visit incentives ($0.18) yet 
the quality score for curative care accounts for 17% of the overall weight.  Again, results for 




Basinga and Gertler argue that supply-side incentives can positively impact quality of 
services and additionally increase use of services if strongly incentivized and within the control of 
the provider.  Understanding the effects of PBF on less incentivized services both the quality and 
the use, will better inform adjustments to the strategy as Rwanda moves forward. 
Advocates hail PBF as a potential reform strategy that may profoundly influence the 
provision of health care through greater local provider autonomy under strong national oversight, 
51
 praise it as a flexible financing strategy that is responsive to country context and evolving 
health priorities, 
69, 70
 and promote it as an effective strategy for increasing service use. 
36, 59, 61
  
Critics on the other hand, raise concerns regarding the limited empirical evidence for PBF, 
specifically the effect on equity of service use, on health outcomes not just service outputs, on the 
potential adverse effects for non-incentivized services, and on the long term impact and 
sustainability of this approach.
71-74
  Recognizing the legitimacy of these concerns, the building of 





Research Aims and Methods 
 
The PBF program implemented in Rwanda was designed to increase provider output 
thereby increasing health service utilization particularly for maternal and child primary health 
care.  This study examines the question of whether a PBF program can help close the equity gap 
in use of maternal and child health services when there are no specific provisions to target the 
poorest in the population.    
This proposed work builds on a prior impact evaluation work for PBF in the following ways.  
First, the intent of PBF in Rwanda is to increase provider output thereby increasing health service 
utilization for maternal and child services; however, historical use of services has been 
inequitable for the poorest in the population.  This work will focus on the differential impact of 
PBF on service utilization among the poor to assess whether the PBF program is pro-poor.  
Second, speculation about the possible detrimental effects to less-incentivized services or non-
incentivized services, have been raised.75  This evaluation in part will examine child curative care 
which is less incentivized under PBF and will look at the pro-poor effect for curative care.  Third, 
this evaluation will demonstrate the feasibility of using routine, national survey data for national 
program evaluations.  Impact evaluations are critical to our understanding of the actual effect of 
new interventions such as PBF; however, extensive data collection solely for the sake of program 
evaluation is at times prohibitively expensive.  The use of existing national survey data would 
help reduce costs and minimize duplication of efforts.  Lastly, additional examination of 
successful PBF programs in sub-Saharan Africa provide evidence of best practices that Rwanda 
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can incorporate to improve their model and countries looking to replicate Rwanda’s model can 
benefit as well.   
   
Aims and Hypotheses 
This evaluation seeks to determine whether the Rwanda’s PBF program differentially 
influenced the use of select, preventive and curative health care services among the poorest 
women and children.  The following specific aims are addressed: 
 
Aim 1:  To determine whether the effect of PBF on the use of maternal health services in Rwanda 
varies by household wealth status.   
 
Hypothesis 1A.  The probability of receiving an adequate number of ANC visits and early ANC 
visits increased more from 2005 to 2007 among the poorest women living in districts 
financed through PBF compared to the least poor women living in PBF districts and relative 
to women living in control districts.    
 
Hypothesis 1B. The probability of delivering in a health facility increased more from 2005 to 
2007 among the poorest women living in districts financed through PBF compared to the 
least poor women living in PBF districts and relative to women living in control districts.    
 
Hypothesis 1C. The probability of adopting modern contraception increased more from 2005 to 
2007 among the poorest women living in districts financed through PBF compared to the 
least poor women living in PBF districts and relative to women living in control districts.    
 
Aim 2:  To estimate the effects of PBF on illness and responses to illness for children from 
varying economic strata in Rwanda. 
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Hypothesis 2A.  The probability of a child sick with diarrhea, fever, and/or symptoms of acute 
respiratory infection (ARI) is negatively associated with the adoption of PBF by the district. 
Hypothesis 2B. The probability of reported illness with diarrhea, fever, and/or symptoms of ARI 
decreased more from 2005 to 2007 among the poorest children living in districts financed 
through PBF compared to the least poor children living in PBF districts and relative to 
children living in control districts.  
Hypothesis 2C.  The probability of a child sick with diarrhea, fever, and/or symptoms of ARI 
receiving consultation from a health facility is positively associated with the adoption of PBF 
by the district. 
Hypothesis 2D. The probability of seeking consultation from a health facility when sick with 
diarrhea, fever, and/or symptoms of ARI increased more from 2005 to 2007 among the 
poorest children living in districts financed through PBF compared to the least poor children 
living in PBF districts and relative to children living in control districts.  
Hypothesis 2E.  Among those children reporting diarrhea or fever who received care from a 
health facility, the probability of receipt of ORT or antibiotics for diarrhea or a fever reducer 




Andersen’s Behavioral Model of Health Services Use was first developed in 1968 to 
explain the use of formal health care services.
76
  The intent was to provide a theoretical 
framework for understanding the use of and access to services in order to assist with the 
development of policies that promoted equitable use of health services.
76
  The core of the model 
is built around the assumption that population characteristics, classified as predisposing 
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characteristics, enabling factors, and need for services contribute to one’s decision to seek health 
care.  In 1995, Andersen unveiled the fourth iteration of this model which expanded to include 
consideration of the environmental context as well as the outcomes of service utilization, 
including health outcomes and service use experiences, that may influence decisions for 
subsequent service use.
76
  The conceptual model (Figure 2.1) illustrates Andersen’s Behavioral 
Model of Health Services Use populated with variables of interest for preventive and curative 
care seeking in Rwanda.  For the purposes of this study, the analyses focused on the predisposing 
characteristics, enabling factors, and need that lead to use of health services, with some 
consideration of prior health service utilization. 
Predisposing characteristics are those individual and household factors that might 
predispose one’s need for health services and the use of those services.  These are the factors that 
might influence someone’s desire to seek care.  Numerous studies have identified socio-
demographic predictors for maternal and child health service utilization, including age, education, 
marital status, and parity/birth order.   
Enabling factors are those characteristics at the household or community level that may 
facilitate or impede one’s use of services.  Typical considerations include financial and 
geographic access to services, such as family economic status, health insurance, rural or urban 
residence, and distance to health facilities.  By 2007, over 85% of the DHS surveyed population 
lived within 5 kilometers of a facility and 100% lived with 10 kilometers, hence geographic 
access is assumed to be adequate. 
Need for services is dependent on the service and on the assumptions one makes about 
need for skilled care.  In the case of deliveries and curative care, the choice to seek care is 
influenced by one’s perception of need – is the delivery at risk for complications or is the child 
sick enough.  From a population perspective, use of prenatal care and institutional deliveries is 
the goal for 100% of pregnancies in order to lower the incidence of maternal and neonatal 
mortality.  Modern family planning methods are “needed” for any woman wishing to space or 
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limit pregnancies.  Preventive childhood services such as immunizations and Vitamin A 
supplementation are also recommended for the entire population. Need for curative care from a 
health facility is harder to estimate.  First the need is conditional on a disease event, which as 
mentioned above is more likely among the poorer populations and the severity may be more 
likely among the poor as well due to inadequate initial response.  Second, the perception of 
severity for the parent may be hard to measure and for the researcher impossible to determine on 
an individual basis.  However at a population level, the operating assumption is that most of the 
children whose parents remember an illness were likely sick enough to warrant medical 
consultation and/or treatment.      
Prior use of services and outcomes.  One’s entry into the formal health system, either 
through maternal or child health services, exposes one to health education opportunities and 
ideally positive health outcomes that would influence future use.  Previous use of services may 
also be indicative of a more modern view of health care that influenced original and subsequent 
use.  Early use of ANC and multiple ANC visits increases the probability of skilled birth 
attendants and facility deliveries in many countries.
77-82
  In Rwanda, Chandrasehkar concluded 
that three ANC visits was the threshold providers should aim for because women with three visits 
were 4.6 times more likely to deliver in a facility and 7 times more likely if more than three ANC 
visits were reported.
37
  Previous facility births as well as previous neonatal deaths have both been 
found to be predictive of subsequent contraceptive use, ANC attendance, and facility delivery.
78, 
83
  Skilled ANC care as well as facility deliveries have also been predictive of subsequent care-





























Figure 2.1.  Conceptual Model 
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Study Setting and Design 
The Republic of Rwanda, “Land of a Thousand Hills”, is nestled in the highlands of the 
Great Lake region in eastern Africa.  This small, landlocked country is home to approximately 
11.4 million people, making it the most densely populated country in Africa.
87
   Nineteen percent 
of the population lives in urban centers, with close to one million in the capital Kigali.  The 
economy is driven equally by agriculture and services with each comprising approximately 42% 
of the Gross Domestic Product; the additional 14% is supplied by industry.
87
  The vast majority 
(90%) of the population is engaged in subsistence farming, with some mining and agribusiness.
87
   
The formal health sector in Rwanda is comprised of public health facilities, government-
assisted health facilities or agréés, private health facilities and traditional healers.  Agréés are 
private non-profit and faith-based health facilities that work within the public health system and 
have agreed to support the national health policies and abide by the protocols in place for the 
public facilities.  In 2005, the combined number of public and agréés facilities was 385 health 
centers, 34 district hospitals and 4 national referral hospitals.
4
  The private sector increased to 
more than 300 dispensaries and clinics, with over 50% of those located in and around Kigali.
4
  
The public sector health system provides a tiered system of facilities with health centers 
providing the primary point of access for comprehensive preventive and curative care.  Health 
posts and dispensaries are one tier down, typically located in more remote areas and serving a 
smaller population with a minimum basic package of services.  Hospitals are most typically a 
district referral resource with expanded capabilities for treatment and rehabilitation.  There is at 
least one district hospital per administrative district while the four national hospitals serve as 
referral hospitals for the districts, providing more highly trained providers and specialized 
services. 
The government’s Health Strategic Plan for 2005-2009 set an ambitious plan to expand 
the use and quality of health services in Rwanda in an effort to meet the MDGs.  Specifically the 
Plan included improving financial access to health services through increasing uptake of health 
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insurance and increasing government expenditures on health; increasing human resources and 
geographic access for public health through infrastructure building, transportation support, PBF 
and training; and improving select maternal and child health outcomes through increased uptake 
of modern contraception, ANC and delivery care, as well as expanding the program for integrated 
management of childhood illnesses.
4
   
In 2005, the government adopted a national performance-based financing (PBF) program 
for health centers and hospitals.  PBF was designed to incentivize health facility personnel to 
increase health service productivity and improve service quality through special contracting at the 
facility-level.  This supply-side incentive theoretically motivates providers and facilities to attract 
and maintain a client base in need of health services.   Productivity is explicitly incentivized 
through a payment per health service provided, for example growth monitoring visits, facility 
deliveries, or tetanus toxoid immunizations.  In Rwanda, the 14 incentivized services cover 
evidence-based primary maternal and child health services, both preventive and curative care 




 for details). In addition, service quality is assessed in a 
quarterly site visit and the quality score is used to weight the overall PBF payment, such that 
facilities receive a portion only of the performance payment if the quality score is not perfect.  
This contracting mechanism empowers providers, facilities, and the local health authorities to 
distribute these supplemental funds according to local priorities; typically provider bonuses as 
well as facility supplies and equipment, or local outreach efforts.    
Prior to the national PBF scale-up, administrative districts not involved in earlier PBF 
pilot projects, were matched on population density, rainfall and livelihood.  Matched districts 
were randomly assigned to early implementation between January 2006 and November 2007, or 
delayed implementation beginning in April 2008.
61
  Health facility catchment areas map closely 
to administrative districts, such that when an intervention district adopted PBF, the district 
population theoretically gained access to intervention sites.  This experimental design allows for 
comparisons over time between the early implementers or intervention districts and delayed 
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implementers or control districts.  National household survey data, collected independently from 


















Demographic and Health Surveys 
Data from the 2005 Rwanda Demographic and Health Survey (RDHS) and the 2007-
2008 Rwanda Interim Demographic and Health Survey (RIDHS) provide individual and 
household socio-demographic characteristics and health indicators for maternal and child health, 
including ANC, birthing practices, family planning, immunizations, childhood illness, care 
seeking, and treatment received.   
The 2005 RDHS employed a two-stage national sampling design to produce a sample 
representative of the 12 former provinces and stratified by rural and urban residence.  Primary 
sampling units (PSUs) or clusters were selected from the 2002 General Population and Housing 
Census enumeration areas based on a probability proportional to the number of households within 
the enumeration area.  Twenty households per urban cluster (111 clusters) and 24 households per 
rural cluster (351 clusters) were randomly selected.  Within each participating household, one 























the house or who slept in the house the previous evening were eligible for interviews.  In total, 
462 clusters were sampled, 10,272 households completed interviews (99.7% response rate), 
11,321 women completed interviews (98.1% response rate), and data on 8,715 live births during 
the preceding five years and 8,649 children under the age of five was provided.
13
  Individual 




The 2007-2008 RIDHS selected 250 of the clusters that were sampled in the 2005 RDHS.  
These 250 clusters were sampled with probability proportional to size, and representative at the 
national and provincial level, both the former 12 provinces and subsequently the new 5 provinces 
formed in 2006.  To assure reliable estimates for the urban areas and robust estimates for 
indicators at the provincial level, urban clusters were slightly over-sampled and 30 households 
were randomly selected from all clusters.  One cluster was excluded from the surveying when it 
was found to be a refugee camp.  In total, 249 clusters were sampled, 7,377 households 
completed interviews (99.5% response rate), 7,313 women completed interviews (97.1% response 
rate) and data on 5,656 live births in the preceding five years and 5,489 children under the age of 
five was provided. Individual sampling weights are included in the dataset to ensure that the 
sample is nationally representative.
14
 
Geographic coordinates were available for 246 of the clusters, facilitating the creation of 
a panel dataset of matched clusters from 2005 and 2007.  Eleven pilot districts, including the 
three districts surrounding Kigali, were excluded from the analysis, eliminating 96 clusters.  
Longitudinal data from a total of 150 clusters were thus used in the analysis, with 86 clusters 
from the 12 intervention districts and 64 from the 7 control districts.  Details on the study sample 
of women and children for each analysis are presented in chapters 3 and 4, respectively. 
Using DHS data is advantageous because it allows one to look at the effect in the 
population rather than relying on data from facilities that are incentivized to improve reporting.  
Three factors facilitate the use of DHS data for this evaluation:  a) the random assignment of 
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program implementation at the district level; b) the close match between district boundaries and 
facility catchment areas post-decentralization; and c) the timing of the two DHS, book-ending the 
implementation for intervention districts. 
 
Health Facility Data 
The Ministry of Health hosts a database of public health facilities on their website, with 
geographic location (GPS coordinates) for health centers and hospitals.  Figure 2.3 shows the 
phased implementation of the PBF program, the health facilities and DHS clusters.  At baseline, 










The approach described below applies to the analyses for maternal and child health 
service use.  Details specific to each analysis are included in chapters 3 and 4 respectively.   
Bivariate descriptive analyses of baseline population characteristics and for each outcome 
variable by year and wealth quintile were completed.  Concentration curves plotting the 
cumulative outcome variables by the cumulative percentage of women ranked by wealth were 
created to graphically illustrate inequity in service use by wealth status. 
88
  Concentration curves 
were also created for child use of services but were not very revealing, hence they are not 
presented. 
A difference-in-differences (DD) estimation strategy was used to evaluate the impact of 
PBF on the use of primary health services.  The DD estimator calculates the change in mean 
outcome (Y) for the intervention and control groups over time and takes the difference between 
the groups to determine the effect of PBF, written as:   
 
Equation (1):                                             .   
 
A linear probability model (LPM) was run for each outcome, with cluster-robust standard 
errors and individual, maternal, and household covariates included to reduce residual variance 
and improve the efficiency of the estimates.  Community fixed effects were subsequently 
included to control for time-invariant unobserved community differences.  The DD with 
community fixed effects specification is written as: 
 




where subscripted indexes are defined as i=individual, j=community or cluster, and t=time.  
Terms in the model include the vector of covariates (X), a dummy variable for time period 
2007/08 (Y07=1 for post-implementation), and a dummy program variable for clusters located in 
districts with performance-based financing (PBF=1 for intervention district, 0 for control).  The 
primary coefficient of interest is β3, which captures the effect of the PBF program on the 
outcomes Y.   By subtracting the differences over time between program areas, the unobserved 
time-invariant community fixed effects (µj) will be differenced out.  Unobserved time-varying 
community variables (µjt) are excluded from the model because community characteristics are 
unlikely to change dramatically during the short 2-3 year interval, any changes are likely to be 
minor, and the fixed community differences are already differenced out.  Individual unobserved 
time-invariant fixed effects (µi) are also excluded because any potential bias due to omitted 
variables might arise at the community level where the program intervention was assigned, rather 
than the individual level. 
Interaction terms between wealth quintiles and the PBF intervention were then estimated 
to identify the differential effect of PBF among women and children from poorer families.  The 
model specification shown below is written with only one set of wealth interaction terms to 
illustrate the inclusion of the interactions.   
 
Equation (3):                                                      
                                                     
                       
 
where subscripted indexes are defined as i=individual, j=community, and t=time.  Dummy 
variables for the wealth quintiles were added.  Wealth1 represents the poorest 20% of households, 
additional terms for Wealth2, Wealth3, and Wealth4 were also included (though not shown), and 
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the least poor, Wealth5, served as the referent group.  The primary coefficient of interest (β7), is 
for the triple interaction which captures the effect of the PBF program on the probability of the 
outcome among women/children from the poorest households compared to the probability of the 
outcome among women/children from the least poor households, relative to women/children 
living in control districts.  Interaction terms between insurance status and PBF residence, and 
insurance with wealth quintiles were also tested. 
Additionally for the woman’s analysis, the models were stratified by residence to identify 
any difference in program effect in rural versus urban settings that were not revealed in the full 
model when residence was differenced out by the community fixed effects specification.  
However due to the minimal number of urban clusters (n=22) and the allowance for intracluster 
correlation, correct cluster-robust standard errors will not be produced with more than 21 
variables in the model.  Hence the number of covariates was restricted for the stratified models to 
those considered most influential as noted in the results.  
For the child analysis, marginal effects for each population group of interest – 
intervention group, control group, poorest in intervention, wealthiest in intervention, etc – were 
calculated to illustrate the changes in the selected outcomes over time by group.  Stratification by 
residence was not possible due to the smaller sample. 




Are Maternal Health Services Reaching the Poorest Women? 
 
The aim of this analysis is to examine the effects of PBF on equity in maternal health 
service use.  Specifically, in the absence of provisions targeting the poor, does PBF increase 
health service use differentially among the poorest women? 
 
Study Sample 
The panel dataset of 150 clusters included 7,899 women 15-49 years of age who lived in 
either an intervention (4,477) or control district (3,422); 3,611 women from the 2005 data and 
4,288 from 2007.  Three pregnancy-related outcomes were studied:  early initiation of ANC, four 
or more ANC visits during pregnancy, and delivery in a health facility.  The window of analysis 
for these outcomes was limited to deliveries in the previous 18 months to isolate the effects of 
PBF.  The final dataset for pregnancy-related outcomes included 2,044 women; 1,170 from 
intervention districts and 874 from control districts.   The fourth outcome studied was use of 
modern contraceptives among married women.  This final dataset included 4,121 currently 
married woman; 2,328 from intervention districts and 1,793 from control districts.   
 
Measures 
The four dependent variables, early initiation of ANC, four or more ANC visits during 
pregnancy, delivery in a health facility and use of modern contraceptives, were collected in each 
DHS.  For this evaluation, receipt of formal ANC services includes women who reported 
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receiving prenatal care from a trained medical provider in a public or private health facility.  
WHO recommends four or more ANC visits and early initiation of care, defined as any visit 
before the 4
th
 month of pregnancy.
89
  Facility deliveries include delivery in any public or private 
health facility, and are promoted worldwide as a key strategy to reduce maternal mortality.  
Modern contraception was limited to pills, injectables, implants, or IUDs, as these methods were 
specifically promoted under PBF.  Each of these outcomes is incentivized through PBF, although 
the payment rate varies by service, with the highest monetary incentive for a facility delivery.   
The key independent variables are residence in a PBF intervention or control district and 
household wealth.  Assignment to a PBF intervention district was based on the district in which 
the survey cluster was located; hence all women from the same cluster were assigned the same 
PBF status.  Household wealth scores based on asset ownership and housing characteristics were 
created separately for the 2005 and 2007 study samples.  Polychoric principal component analysis 
(PCA) was used to calculate a wealth score that maximized the contribution of binary and 
categorical variables.
90
  The choice of assets for the wealth score was based on the economic 
context in Rwanda and data availability. Assets for 2005 included television, radio, telephone, 
bicycle, and land ownership; housing characteristics included electricity, drinking water, toilet 
facility, cooking fuel, and flooring material.  Three assets were excluded due to perfect prediction 
with other assets:  refrigerator, motorcycle, and car.  For 2007, land ownership data was not 
collected, car and motorcycle ownership were combined as a single variable, and refrigerator was 
excluded, again for reasons of perfect prediction.  The first component of the polychoric PCA 
was used to create the wealth index score, explaining 59% of the variance for 2005 and 57% for 
2007.  Households were divided into quintiles based on their wealth index score; the new wealth 
quintile was assigned to each woman living in the household.   
 Selection of the covariates was dependent on the outcome variable.  For all four 
outcomes, covariates included age, education, marital status, parity, insurance and prior facility 
birth within past five years.  Additionally for the facility delivery outcome, ANC visits were 
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included, and for the modern contraception outcome, history of a previous child death in the 
family was included.     
 
Results 
Comparison of the intervention and control study populations at baseline indicates that 
the random assignment of districts to intervention phase created comparable populations with no 
significant differences (Table 3.1).    
 
Table 3.1  Woman and household characteristics by intervention and control samples at baseline, 
2005 RDHS weighted data 
 
Total Intervention Control 
Characteristics (n=3,613) % (n=2,227) % (n=1,386) % Diff. p-value 
Age < 20 years 743 20.6 469 21.1 274 19.8 1.29 0.368 
Age ≥ 35 years 359 9.9 218 9.8 141 10.2 -0.38 0.704 
Primary School 618 17.1 375 16.8 243 17.5 -0.69 0.760 
Married 1832 50.7 1124 50.5 707 51.0 -0.54 0.825 
Parity:  No Births 1309 36.2 815 36.6 495 35.7 0.88 0.659 
Parity:  More than 5 774 21.4 481 21.6 293 21.1 0.46 0.776 
Wealth Status  
       Poorest 737 20.4 476 21.4 262 18.9 2.47 0.310 
Poorer 775 21.5 442 19.8 333 24.0 -4.18 0.115 
Middle 678 18.8 414 18.6 264 19.0 -0.46 0.814 
Less Poor 718 19.9 452 20.3 265 19.1 1.18 0.597 
Least Poor 704 19.5 442 19.8 262 18.9 0.94 0.799 
Health Insurance 1768 48.9 1051 47.2 717 51.7 -4.54 0.248 
Rural Residence 3302 91.4 2051 92.1 1251 90.3 1.84 0.653 
Prior Facility Delivery 203 5.6 121 5.4 83 6.0 -0.56 0.521 
 
The concentration curves (Figures 3.1-3.4) plot the cumulative share in service use by 
wealth status for 2005 and 2007.  Women by wealth quintile are plotted on the x-axis with the 
poorest women located in the lower left.  The cumulative outcome variable is plotted on the y-
axis.  The line of equity is achieved when the use of the service is equal across wealth quintiles.  
A line below the line of equity indicates the outcome has lower values among the poorer women 
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in the population.  The equity gap in 2005 is most evident for use of modern contraception, with 
60% of the poorest women reporting less than 40% of the share of modern contraceptive use 
(Figure 3.4).  Likewise facility deliveries were more often reported among the wealthier in 2005 
(Figure 3.3).  By 2007, the gap in equity for all four outcomes decreased.   
        
Figure 3.1. Concentration curve: Early ANC   Figure 3.2. Concentration curve: ≥ 4 ANC  
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The absolute change in service use improved from 2005 to 2007 for all four outcomes 
(Table 3.2).  The most dramatic improvements were measured for facility deliveries among the 
intervention and control groups, 36.0 and 19.9 percentage-point changes respectively.  For ANC 
visits and contraceptive use, average service use improved approximately 14 percentage points 
from 2005 to 2007.   
Looking at disparities, the inequity of facility deliveries seen in 2005 between the least 
poor 20% of the population compared to the poorer 80% of the population is substantial for the 
intervention and control groups.  By 2007, improved use by the middle income groups narrowed 
this gap in facility deliveries.  A similar pattern is seen for modern contraceptive use in 2005 
where use doubles among the least poor quintile compared to the poorer 80%.  This disparity by 
wealth is much less evident for early ANC initiation and nearly non-existent for meeting the 
recommended number of ANC visits. 
Modern contraceptive use was twice as high among urban versus rural residents in 2005, 
a pattern seen also for facility deliveries.  In absolute terms, the improvements between 2005 and 
2007 for urban and rural residents were similar for modern contraceptives and facility deliveries.  
By 2007, approximately one-quarter of the women reported early ANC and adequate number of 
ANC visits, with no clear differences between rural and urban communities.     
Comparisons of absolute changes between PBF intervention and control groups between 
2005 and 2007 suggest that PBF may have positively influenced the increased use of facility 
deliveries.  However, no consistent patterns of higher service use are evident for intervention 
versus control populations for ANC visits or modern contraceptive use.  Further analyses using 
econometric techniques provides an opportunity to control for unmeasured influences or 
programs that may have contributed to the changes seen, hence offering insights into the effect of 




Table 3.2.  Percent of women reporting key outcomes by study sample and year 
  Intervention Group   Control Group 











 7.2 23.8 16.6*** 
 
6.6 20.0 13.4*** 
Wealth:         Poorest 6.2 20.0 13.8 
 
1.2 22.1 20.9** 
 Poorer  8.8 17.5 8.7 
 
5.0 25.4 20.4** 
 Middle 5.4 25.6 20.2*** 
 
5.3 13.6 8.3 
 Less Poor 6.1 25.0 18.9*** 
 
10.2 19.8 9.6 
 Least Poor  10.5 31.7 21.2 
 
10.7 18.3 7.6 
Residence:     Rural 6.6 23.4 16.8*** 
 
6.9 19.5 12.6*** 
 Urban 16.5 28.6 12.1 
 
4.3 25.1 20.8** 
Four or more ANC
2
  13.3 24.6 11.3*** 
 
10.0 22.8 12.8*** 
Wealth:         Poorest 11.1 20.4 9.3 
 
7.8 20.5 12.7* 
 Poorer  18.7 26.2 7.5 
 
7.2 22.1 14.9** 
 Middle 7.2 23.5 16.3** 
 
8.8 21.0 12.2* 
 Less Poor 14.2 27.6 13.4* 
 
11.2 22.4 11.2* 
 Least Poor  16.5 26.2 9.7 
 
15.3 29.2 13.9 
Residence:    Rural 13.1 24.6 11.5** 
 
10.2 22.8 12.6*** 
 Urban 16.6 25.2 8.6 
 
8.8 22.3 13.5 
Facility Delivery
2
 23.4 59.4 36.0*** 
 
28.8 48.7 19.9*** 
Wealth:         Poorest 17.7 44.2 26.5 
 
16.0 45.6 29.6** 
 Poorer  19.8 53.4 33.6*** 
 
24.3 43.7 19.4* 
 Middle 18.8 64.2 45.4*** 
 
20.3 50.0 29.7*** 
 Less Poor 21.0 61.6 40.6*** 
 
29.1 44.6 15.5 
 Least Poor  42.1 77.1 35.0 
 
53.5 62.3 8.8 
Residence:    Rural 22.1 57.8 35.7*** 
 
27.9 47.6 19.7** 
 Urban 44.0 79.3 35.3* 
 
35.3 61.4 26.1 
Modern Contraception
2,3
 6.1 22.0 15.9*** 6.8 23.3 16.5*** 
Wealth:         Poorest 3.8 18.4 14.6*** 
 
4.9 18.1 13.2** 
 Poorer  2.3 18.0 15.7*** 
 
3.5 23.0 19.5*** 
 Middle 3.1 20.3 17.2*** 
 
4.9 17.7 12.8** 
 Less Poor 6.7 23.9 17.2*** 
 
6.6 25.5 18.9*** 
 Least Poor  14.9 29.0 14.1** 
 
14.4 31.7 17.3** 
Residence:    Rural 5.6 21.2 15.6*** 
 
6.2 22.6 16.4*** 
 Urban 12.6 33.4 20.8*   13.8 30.7 16.9* 
1 
T-tests for differences between 2005 and 2007.  *p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
2 
No statistical differences found between intervention and control groups at baseline.
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Results from the LPM were used to obtain the difference-in-differences estimator for the 
effect of PBF on maternal health services (Table 3.3).  The probability of a facility delivery 
increased by 10.0 percentage points in the intervention districts compared to the control districts 
(p=0.014), while no significant effects were noted for ANC visits or modern contraceptive use.   
 
Table 3.3.  Estimated effects of performance-based financing on service use (difference-in-
differences estimate) 
  Difference in service use in  
Intervention Districts 
 
Maternal Health Service N      Coeff               (SE) p value 
First Trimester ANC Visit
1
 1,983 0.011  (0.037) 0.770  
Four or more ANC Visits
1
 1,983 -0.053 (0.036) 0.145 
Facility Delivery
2
 1,977 0.100* (0.040) 0.014 
Use of Modern Contraception
3
 4,050 0.010 (0.022) 0.641 
1
 Covariates include wealth, age, education, marital status, parity, insurance, and prior 
facility birth within past five years.
 
2
 Covariates include wealth, age, education, marital status, parity, insurance, any ANC visits, 
and prior facility birth within past five years.
 
3
 Modern contraception includes pill, injectable, implant and IUD.  Covariates include 
wealth, age, education, marital status, parity, insurance, previous child death, and prior 
facility birth within past five years.
 
 
Our primary question however, is whether PBF reached the poorest of the population, 
that is did PBF help close the gap in service use between the least poor and poorest women in 
Rwanda.  Interactions between program effect and wealth quintile revealed no statistically 
significant differences (Table 3.4).  For facility deliveries, no consistent pattern in use relative to 
household wealth status was found.  The strongest predictors of facility delivery after controlling 
for PBF remain parity (β=0.408, p<0.001), prior facility delivery (β=0.368, p<0.001), and any 
ANC visits during index pregnancy (β=0.193, p<0.001), while health insurance contributes 
modestly (β=0.056, p=0.012) (data from full models in Appendix A.2, A.3).   Receipt of four or 
more ANC visits increased among the poorer 80% of the population compared to the least poor, 
particularly for women in the middle (β=0.197, p=0.102) and the richer (β=0.139, p=0.217) 
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wealth quintiles, although the results are not significant.  No clear patterns emerge for either early 
ANC initiation or modern contraceptive use by wealth group. 
 
Table 3.4.  Estimated differential effects of performance-based financing by wealth on service use 
(difference-in-differences estimate with wealth interaction terms) 
Effect of PBF by Wealth 


















Coeff  (SE) Coeff  (SE) Coeff  (SE) Coeff  (SE) 
 PBF among Poorest -0.062 0.091 -0.040 0.058 
 
(0.104) (0.103) (0.119) (0.072) 
 PBF among Poorer -0.097 0.048 0.102 0.022 
 
(0.113) (0.122) (0.114) (0.072) 
 PBF among Middle 0.029 0.197 0.045 0.088 
 
(0.105) (0.119) (0.112) (0.075) 
 PBF among Less Poor 0.051 0.139 0.020 0.056 
  (0.117) (0.112) (0.123) (0.073) 
Number of Clusters 150 150 150 150 
Number of Women 1983 1983 1977 4050 
1
 Covariates include age, education, marital status, parity, insurance, and prior facility birth  
2
 Covariates include age, education, marital status, parity, insurance, prior facility births and ANC visits 
3
 Modern contraception includes pill, injectable, implant and IUD.  Covariates include age, education, 
marital status, parity, insurance, prior facility birth and previous child death 
 
Finally, the impact of PBF by wealth was estimated separately for rural and urban 
residence.  First a DD model interacting with rural residence rather than wealth quintiles was run 
for each outcome (data not shown).  No differences in program impact were found for rural 
versus urban residents for the four outcomes studied.  Next the primary DD with wealth 
interaction terms was run for stratified rural and urban samples, results presented in Table 3.5.  
No clear patterns emerge in the stratified analysis, leading to the conclusion that PBF did not 




Table 3.5.  Estimated differential effects of performance-based financing by wealth on service 







































PBF among the 
Poorest 
-0.147 0.012 0.087 -0.069 -0.018 0.096 0.082 -0.031 
(0.111) (0.304) (0.121) (0.242) (0.148) (0.300) (0.083) (0.181) 
PBF among the 
Poorer 
-0.178 0.014 0.080 -0.642 0.122 0.022 0.034 0.054 
(0.122) (0.327) (0.138) (0.327) (0.143) (0.337) (0.084) (0.196) 
PBF among 
the Middle 
0.071 -0.573* 0.224 -0.277 0.081 -0.012 0.114 0.073 
(0.115) (0.254) (0.129) (0.298) (0.151) (0.189) (0.086) (0.190) 
PBF among 
the Less Poor 
-0.027 0.167 0.108 0.290 0.108 -0.379 0.089 0.009 
(0.129) (0.212) (0.124) (0.259) (0.152) (0.231) (0.088) (0.146) 
No. of Clusters 128 22 128 22 128 22 128 22 
No. of Women 1733 302 1733 302 1682 296 3586 535 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05 
1
 Covariates limited to marital status, parity, and insurance. 
2
 Covariates limited to parity, prior facility birth and any ANC visits. 
3
 Modern contraception includes pill, injectable, implant and IUD.  Covariates limited to parity. 
 
Discussion and Limitations 
To combat the pervasive low use of maternal health services in Rwanda in the early 
2000s, the Government of Rwanda promoted both supply-side and demand-side financing 
strategies.  Performance-based financing was scaled up nationally to increase the supply of health 
services through an incentive program for providers and health facilities.  Meanwhile, community 
based health insurance rapidly increased to reduce financial barriers for consumers.  Supporters 
for PBF recognized that increasing and improving service performance was not solely an issue of 
lack of provider knowledge or skills, 
91
 rather the government needed to target multiple facets of 
provider motivation to increase service output.  Serneels and Lievens propose four institutional 
factors that influence health worker performance in Rwanda:  incentives, monitoring 
arrangements, professional norms, and intrinsic motivations. 
92
  PBF, through a set of monetary 
incentives and increased supervision and monitoring, directly addresses the first two factors.  
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Indirectly, PBF may improve the professional norms or culture of a facility as colleagues begin to 
work together towards higher outputs and subsequently intrinsic motivations may improve as one 
takes pride in the improved performance of the facility.  Basinga and colleagues found that the 
monetary incentives of PBF did increase the percentage of facility deliveries and the quality of 
ANC services provided in intervention sites, after controlling for the increase in absolute health 
expenditures (approximately 22%).
61
  Our analysis confirmed some of these findings with 
national data collected independently of the intervention.  In 2007, women living in intervention 
districts were 10.0 percentage points more likely to deliver in a health facility compared to 
women in control districts, a 42.7% increase in facility deliveries attributable to PBF.   
This study took a step further and looked at whether PBF was an effective pro-poor 
strategy, increasing the use of maternal services among the poorest women in the population.  No 
evidence was found that PBF is pro-poor in Rwanda, likewise we found no evidence that PBF is 
pro-rich.  The increase in facility deliveries was seen across all wealth groups ranging from 26-45 
percentage point increases among the intervention group compared to 8-30 percentage point 
increases among the controls (Table 3.2), yet interaction terms between wealth, year and PBF 
program found no differential effect of the program by wealth quintile.  While the equity gap in 
service use for facility deliveries and modern contraceptive use decreased from 2005 to 2007; we 
cannot conclude that PBF was responsible for these improvements.   
So why isn’t PBF a pro-poor strategy in Rwanda? Often health facilities located in poorer 
communities are understaffed, poorly equipped, and less well organized, resulting in health 
services less responsive to the needs of the population.
27, 33
  PBF was designed specifically to 
increase health service output and quality for a health system chronically understaffed.  Inputs 
included financial incentives, training, supervision, and accountability through monitoring and 
reporting of services provided.  A priori, one would anticipate improved quality of services that 
are more responsive to local needs, and subsequently an increased use of services in these 
facilities.  Moreover, facilities had the authority to allocate incentive payments according to 
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perceived need; provider bonuses, equipment replacement, and community outreach efforts all 
were options exercised by local leaders.  Anecdotally we know that some facilities adopted 
outreach strategies to encourage facility use by women from poorer households, including 
waiving or reducing fees, offering transportation, and enlisting community health workers to refer 
women for services.  However there were no specific provisions in the PBF incentive structure or 
the program placement that differentially targeted poorer households or communities; rather the 
program was rolled out uniformly to serve all Rwandans.   
Given the widespread disparities in health service use between the least poor and poorest 
populations in sub-Saharan African, a fair question is why the Government of Rwanda did not 
design a PBF program that explicitly targeted poorer households.  Following the war and 
genocide in Rwanda, maternal health indicators and service utilization was poor across the board.  
Estimated maternal mortality was very high, 1,071 deaths per 100,000 live births from 1994-
2000.
93
  Less than one third of deliveries were assisted by a trained birth attendant and only 27% 
reported delivery in a health facility.  While over 90% of women reported at least one ANC visit 
during pregnancy, only 10% reported receiving the recommended four or more visits, and only 
4% of married women reported modern contraceptive use, down from 13% in 1992, resulting in a 
36% estimated unmet need for family planning in Rwanda.  With such low service statistics in 
2000, a national approach to improve services for everyone was warranted; particularly, one 
could argue, if levels of use among the poorest might continue to lag as long as the wealthiest 
were not achieving high levels of use.
94
 
Rwanda however did not ignore the issue of equity, rather a demand-side effort was 
simultaneously undertaken to reach the poorer populations.  Community-based health insurance 
(CBHI) improved dramatically during this time; reaching estimated levels of 73% coverage by 
2006.
47
  CBHI was developed in an effort to mobilize resources locally for health centers and to 
reduce the financial barriers and risks families faced with unexpected medical costs.  Benefits 
cover a standard set of MCH services, such as family planning, antenatal care, deliveries, 
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consultations, lab work and generic drugs.  Participation requires an enrollment fee and annual 
premium, with the poorest in the community eligible for donor subsidies to cover premiums.
47
  
Analysis of 2005 data found that insured women were significantly less likely to deliver at home, 
and the odds of delivery at home significantly decreased as wealth status increased.
95
  In another 
small scale study in Rwanda, outpatient visits increased significantly when insurance co-
payments were waived, arguing that any point-of-service payment is a barrier to use among the 
poorest.
96
  In our analysis, additional interaction terms with health insurance (insurance and 
wealth, insurance and PBF) found no evidence of the effect of insurance operating differently in 
PBF districts or by wealth group (data not shown).    
A few study limitations merit mention here.  This study purposively used national 
household survey data that was collected independently of the PBF program, in an effort to 
reproduce findings from an earlier program evaluation and to explore different household 
characteristics that may not have been collected in facility statistics or the evaluation survey.  
However, relying on national datasets means certain constraints to the analyses.  First, the 
window between data collection periods for the 2005 and the 2007-08 surveys was only 29 
months and initial PBF payments for intervention districts did not begin until 11 months into that 
window, effectively shrinking the intervention period to 18 months.  This period may be too short 
to measure some program effects. 
Another potential limitation is the structure of the panel dataset.  The survey design re-
sampled the 2005 clusters in 2007, but individuals were not re-interviewed.  The models 
difference out the time-invariant unobserved community-level characteristics, but do not include 
individual-level fixed effects because the individuals change between surveys.   Three of the 
individual-level control variables, health insurance, prior facility delivery, and any ANC visits are 
“choice” variables indicative of some underlying propensity to choose insurance or choose to use 
services.  However, assignment of the PBF program was random at the community-level, 
irrespective of individual characteristics so there is no reason to suspect that PBF program 
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placement is correlated with individual insurance or use of services.  In fact, models run with and 
without these choice variables produced very similar coefficients.  The inclusion of these 
individual covariates merely improved the efficiency of the estimates.   
Finally, the creation of asset-based wealth scores was limited by the questions fielded on 
the 2005 and 2007-08 DHS.  Asset-based indices remain the standard when income and 
expenditure data are not available, yet more researchers are calling for separate rural and urban 
scales.
97-99
  Unfortunately, rural-specific assets such as livestock and land ownership were not 
collected in both surveys, limiting our ability to create separate rural/urban scales.  This prompted 
stratification by residence; however the limited number of urban clusters reduced the power to 
detect differences.  The trend in DHS is now to collect asset information that will allow a 





Impact of PBF on Care-Seeking and Treatment for Childhood Illness 
 
The goal of this analysis is to estimate the effects of performance-based financing on the 
prevalence of illness and the response to these illnesses for children in Rwanda.  More 
specifically, we explore the effect of PBF by household poverty, testing hypotheses that support a 
narrowing of the equity gap in childhood illness and service use between children from the 
poorest and the least poor households. 
 
Study Sample 
The panel dataset of 150 clusters included 5,781 children less than 5 years of age who 
lived in either an intervention (3,307) or control district (2,474).  Slightly over half of the children 
were from the 2007 survey, 3,157 (54.6%).   
 
Measures 
Three primary outcomes were studied:  prevalence of childhood illness, care-seeking at a 
health facility for the reported illness, and treatment received among those who sought care at a 
facility.  In this analysis, care-seeking is reported as success in actually receiving some care at a 
facility, therefore it does not include those who may have tried to obtain care at a facility and 
failed.  Data for reported cases of diarrhea, fever, and symptoms of acute respiratory infections 
(ARI), care sought for these episodes, and treatment received were collected in 2007; treatment 
information for ARI was not collected in 2005.  Across each survey year, fewer than 30% of the 
children reported individual illness with diarrhea, fever, or ARI in the preceding two weeks; 
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subsequent care-seeking narrows the sample as less than 40% of the ill children reported seeking 
facility care.  To maximize the data available, reported illnesses were combined as described 
below. 
In the DHS surveys, caregivers were asked if any child in the home was ill with diarrhea, 
fever, and/or a cough with short, rapid breathing (symptoms of ARI) in the previous two weeks.  
Responses were combined into two dichotomous illness variables:  illness with diarrhea, fever 
and/or ARI; and illness with diarrhea and/or fever, excluding ARI.  This allowed the creation of 
data subsets for those ill including ARI (n=2,073) and those ill excluding ARI (n=1,742).  
Questions regarding treatment received were asked only of the latter group in both survey years.  
Caregivers who reported a sick child were subsequently asked whether advice or treatment was 
sought from any source.  Among those who sought advice a follow-up question asked “Where did 
you seek advice or treatment?”  All those who reported advice sought from public or private 
hospitals, health centers, clinics or health posts were coded as seeking care at a health facility.   
Among those reporting illness with diarrhea and/or fever, a series of follow-up questions were 
asked to identify any treatment or medications administered, either at home or a facility.  A 
dichotomous variable for treatment received was constructed: “yes” if a child with diarrhea 
received oral rehydration salts, recommended home fluids, increased fluids, and/or antibiotics or 
if sick with fever then receipt of fever reducer and/or an anti-malarial; all other responses were 
coded “no”.   
The key independent variables are residence in a PBF intervention or control district and 
household wealth.  Assignment to the PBF intervention and control groups, as well as 
development of wealth scores, was done at the household level as described in chapter 3.  
Selection of the covariates was dependent on the outcome variable.  For all outcomes, covariates 
included child’s age, birth order, gender, facility birth, maternal age, maternal education, marital 
status, and household wealth.  Additionally for the two illness outcomes, toilet facilities, drinking 
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water sources, and bednet ownership were added; for care-seeking and treatment outcomes, 
health insurance status and history of a previous child death in the family were included.     
 
Results 
The random assignment of districts to intervention phase successfully created comparable 
intervention and control populations, with no significant differences between groups at baseline 
(Table 4.1).   Furthermore, no statistical differences in reported illness, care-seeking or treatment 
received were found at baseline between the intervention and control populations (Table 4.2). 
 
Table 4.1.  Comparison of mother and household characteristics between the intervention and 
control samples at baseline, 2005 RDHS weighted data 
 
 
Total Intervention Control Difference 
(N=2619) % (N=1631) % (N=988) % Perc.Pt  p-value
1
 
Child         
Age < 12 months 590 22.5 376 23.0 214 21.6 1.40 0.406 
Sex: Boy 1333 50.9 843 51.7 489 49.5 2.20 0.289 
Birth Order: 1st Birth 439 16.7 275 16.9 164 16.5 0.40 0.846 
Birth Order: ≥ 5th  988 37.7 632 38.7 356 36.0 2.70 0.335 
Slept under Bednet 277 10.8 179 11.2 97 10.1 1.10 0.621 
Health Facility Birth 586 22.4 348 21.4 238 24.1 -2.70 0.409 
Mother         
Age < 20 years 497 19.0 336 20.6 161 16.3 4.30 0.064 
Age ≥ 35 years 386 14.7 239 14.6 147 14.9 -0.30 0.886 
Primary School grad. 445 17.0 275 16.8 170 17.2 -0.40 0.881 
Married 1310 88.2 1429 87.6 881 89.1 -1.50 0.380 
Previous Child Death 1126 43.0 714 43.8 412 41.7 2.10 0.495 
Household 
        
    Wealth: Poorest 498 19.0 318 19.5 180 18.2 1.30 0.619 
    Wealth: Poorer 534 20.4 296 18.1 238 24.1 -6.00 0.050 
    Wealth: Middle 548 20.9 367 22.5 181 18.3 4.20 0.109 
    Wealth: Less Poor 525 20.0 342 21.0 182 18.4 2.60 0.326 
    Wealth: Least Poor 515 19.6 308 18.9 206 20.9 -2.00 0.608 
Health Insurance 1283 49.0 771 47.3 512 51.8 -4.50 0.364 
Rural Residence 2399 91.6 1523 93.4 876 88.6 4.80 0.254 
Improved Toilet
2
 610 23.3 338 20.7 272 27.5 -6.80 0.077 
Clean Water Source
3
 871 33.2 601 36.9 269 27.3 13.50 0.066 
1
  T-tests comparing proportions between intervention and control groups 
2   
Includes flush toilets and improved latrines
 
3   




Comparison of the absolute change in reported diarrhea, fever, and ARI from 2005 to 
2007 shows a decline in illness for both the intervention and control populations, although 
significant only among the intervention group for fever (-5.6 percentage point decline, p=0.018) 
(Table 4.2).  Improvements were seen in care-seeking behavior among those with reported 
diarrhea or fever, while consultations for ARI were inconsistent across study groups, with a 
decline in visits among the intervention group and an increase in visits among the control group (-
2.3 and 8.3 percentage points respectively).  For diarrhea treatment, more cases received ORT 
than antibiotics as one would expect given that antibiotics are only prescribed for dysentery.  Use 
of ORT increased from 2005 to 2007, while use of antibiotics declined dramatically, though the 
numbers are small.  This decline may in part be attributable to the seasonality of dysentery which 
is more prevalent during the rainy season, when 2005 data was collected, versus the dry season, 
when 2007 data was collected.  For fever treatments, fever reducers were more commonly taken 
compared to anti-malarial medications.  Use of anti-malarials in fact declined from 2005 to 2007 
for both the intervention and control groups, which may be due to a lower prevalence of malaria 
in 2007.
100
   
For each outcome a basic linear probability model (LPM) and an LPM with community 
fixed effects were estimated. Minimal differences were found between the model estimates with 
and without community fixed effects.  The LPM with fixed effects provides a slightly more 
conservative estimate for the intervention and control groups, and is presented below.  The 
difference-in-differences (DD) estimator is used to quantify the change in the intervention group 
relative to the control group.  Lastly, the fixed effects models were run with and without “choice” 
variables (insurance, prior facility delivery) to identify any likely bias in estimates due to 
inclusion of these variables that may arguably introduce endogeneity to the model.  No significant 
or substantial differences in program effect were found with or without these choice variables.  
46 
 
The full basic and fixed effects models with coefficients and standard errors are available in 
Appendix A.   
 
Table 4.2.  Number and percent of children reported ill, seeking care, and receiving treatment in 
past two weeks by study sample and year 



















  N % N %  % N % N % % 
Reported Illness 
          
Diarrhea 218 13.4 270 13.4 0.0 154 15.6 151 12.4 -3.2 
Fever 437 26.8 426 21.2 -5.6* 247 25.1 276 22.7 -2.4 
ARI 305 18.9 376 18.7 -0.2 177 18.2 212 17.5 -0.7 
Facility consultation among those sick 
Diarrhea 35 16.4 87 32.5 16.1** 18 12.0 36 23.7 11.7* 
Fever 108 24.8 146 35.7 10.9* 66 27.0 96 35.7 8.7 
ARI 90 29.4 98 27.1 -2.3 47 27.0 70 35.3 8.3 




           
  ORT  22 61.9 56 64.4 2.5 11 61.8 26 73.0 11.2 
  Antibiotics 18 52.1 23 26.8 -25.3 9 49.9 11 29.9 -20.0 
For Fever: 
          
  Fever Reducer  46 42.4 73 50.5 8.1 29 46.6 43 45.4 -1.2 
  Anti-Malarial 22 20.4 16 11.3 -9.1 19 29.6 14 14.7 -14.9 
Note:  Denominators (not shown) change by study sample, year, and outcome. 
1
  T-tests found no statistical difference between the intervention and control groups at baseline. 
2
  T-tests found no statistical difference between the intervention and control groups post-intervention. 
3
  T-tests for differences between 2005 and 2007; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
4
  Insufficient numbers to calculate test statistic 
 
  The main regression results, including the difference-in-differences estimates, are 
presented in Tables 4.3-4.5.  The change from 2005 to 2007 in the probability of illness among 
children living in intervention districts is in row one of Table 4.3; the change for the control 
population is in row two.  A small, insignificant decline of 1.4 percentage points in reported 
diarrhea, fever, and/or ARI is reported for PBF districts.  The decline is three times higher when 
only looking at diarrhea and/or fever, although the change is still not significant.  The DD 
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estimate suggests a larger reduction in reported disease in the PBF districts compared to the 
control districts, although the effect was small and insignificant.  When adding in wealth 
interaction terms to examine the effect of PBF on equity of reported illness, no differences were 
found across wealth quintiles over time or between intervention and control groups (Appendix 
A.4, A.5). 
Estimates for care seeking in Table 4.3 relied on the sample of reportedly ill children.
a
  
The regression results for care-seeking suggest improvements in both the intervention and control 
groups, yet we only find significant improvements in the control group, a 7.0 percentage point 
increase in care-seeking when sick with diarrhea, fever, and/or ARI and a 7.8 percentage point 
increase when only considering diarrhea and/or fever.   There is no evidence that PBF had a 
significant effect on the probability of seeking care when ill (DD=-0.042, p=0.366; and DD=-
0.030, p=0.540).  Including wealth interaction terms revealed no significant differences in care-
seeking behavior across wealth quintiles or intervention and control groups (Appendix A.4, A.5).   
 
Table 4.3.  Estimated change in the probability of reported childhood illness and facility care-
seeking in PBF and Control Districts, from 2005 to 2007: DD regression results 
  Reported Illness
1



























Average effect of 









Number of Clusters 150 150 
 
150 150 
Number of Children 5,577 5,577 
 
2,020 1,714 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; statistical significance:  *p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
1
 LPM with fixed effects, covariates include: child’s age, birth order, gender, and facility birth; 
mother’s age, education, marital status; household wealth, toilet facilities, drinking water source, and 
bednet ownership. 
2 
LPM with fixed effects, covariates include: child’s age, birth order, gender, and facility birth; 




Data on medical treatments received is only available for those who reported an episode 
of diarrhea and/or fever in the prior two weeks.  To estimate the impact of PBF on receipt of 
treatment, we further limit the sample to those children who reported seeking care at a health 
facility for the illness.  The probability of receiving ORT, antibiotics, fever reducer, or anti-
malarials was 14.5 percentage points higher among children living in PBF districts in 2007 
compared to 2005 (p=0.014) (Table 4.4).  While the probability of treatment among children 
living in control districts decreased 11.8 percentage points during the same time, although this 
finding was not significant (p=0.123).   The average PBF program effect on receipt of treatment 
was 0.263 (p=0.005), indicating a strong program effect on the quality of services provided in 
PBF districts.  For this outcome, the basic LPM without fixed effects produces smaller effects, 
smaller standard errors, and a smaller overall DD estimate.  This is a departure from the pattern 
established for the illness and care-seeking where the estimates were close in size and typically a 
slight over-estimation was found in the basic LPM.  One possible explanation is that the quality 
of services may be more strongly influenced by the rural location, which is differenced out of the 
fixed effects estimation.  When a rural dummy variable is included in the basic LPM, the 
probability of treatment among rural residents is 7.1 percentage points higher (Appendix A.6).      
 
Table 4.4.  Estimated change in the probability of treatment received among children seeking 
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Number of Clusters 150 
 
150 
Number of Children 499 
 
499 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; statistical significance:  *p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
1
 Covariates include: child’s age, birth order, gender, and facility birth; mother’s age, education, 
marital status; household wealth, insurance status, previous child death, and  rural residence. 
2 Covariates include: child’s age, birth order, gender, and facility birth; mother’s age, 




The impact on equity of child services is most apparent when studying the effect on 
treatment received in PBF districts.  Table 4.5 presents the change in probability of treatment 
received over time for children living in PBF districts (row 1) and control districts (row 2), 
followed by the average effect of PBF on treatment received within each wealth quintile (DD 
estimate).  The probability of receiving medication in 2007 was significantly higher for children 
from the three poorest quintiles living in PBF districts compared to children with similar wealth 
status living in control districts; 59.5, 64.6 and 44.1 percentage points higher for the poorest, 
poorer, and middle wealth groups respectively (p<0.05).  Differencing yet again, we estimate the 
effects of PBF among children from the poorest 20% of households led to a 42.6 percentage point 
higher probability of receiving medicine compared to children from the least poor households in 
PBF districts and relative to the effect of PBF on the poorest compared to the least poor in control 
districts.   While not statistically significant, the large, positive effect seen among the poorer 60% 
of the children suggests that PBF is pro-poor.   
 
Table 4.5.  Estimated change in the probability of treatment received for diarrhea or fever by 
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Number of Clusters:     131 
Number of Children:    499 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; statistical significance:  *p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
 DDD estimate for poorest:  (0.207- 0.388) – (0.166 - 0.052) = 0.426    
1LPM with fixed effects, covariates include: child’s age, birth order, gender, and facility birth; mother’s 





Discussion and Limitations 
The premise upon which PBF is built is that increased health care worker productivity 
and quality of primary maternal and child health services provided will reduce the morbidity and 
mortality among vulnerable populations.  In our analysis, we found no evidence to support the 
hypothesis that children living in PBF districts had a lower probability of reported diarrhea, fever, 
or symptoms of ARI.  Moreover there was no finding of differential effect by wealth on 
morbidity; that is PBF was neither a pro-poor nor pro-rich strategy for reducing childhood illness.  
In fact, there was no measurable PBF effect on probability of illness in poorer households, as 
indicated by the coefficients for the wealth quintiles in the simple fixed effects specification 
without any wealth interactions (Appendix A.4, A.5).  This is in line with findings from 
Schellenberg and colleagues, where no association between economic status and childhood 
morbidity was found in a population-based household survey in Tanzania.
35
   
There are several possible explanations for our findings.  First the window of time 
between initial program payments in June 2006 and the follow-up survey in December 2007 may 
arguably be too short to observe a cumulative impact on childhood health of better prenatal care, 
safer deliveries, and improved growth monitoring.  Second, the decline in disease prevalence was 
a national trend with likely multiple contributors.  For example, malaria decreased dramatically 
following a national insecticide-treated bednet campaign in September-October 2006.  The 
prevalence of malaria in Rwanda in 2007 was half that of the lowest point reported in 2005.
100
  
The seasonality of data collection in 2005 compared to 2007 was also possibly correlated with 
seasonality of disease, particularly for severe diarrhea and malaria.  Third, these acute childhood 
illnesses, particularly diarrhea and pneumonia, are the result of environmental exposures such as 
water and air quality or crowding.  PBF is not designed to change the home environment, hence 




  The theoretical argument for improved outcomes in PBF program areas is easier to make 
for the direct health outputs rather than morbidity outcomes.  In this case, looking at whether the 
incentive for outpatient curative care visits increased facility care-seeking for sick children, and 
whether the quality incentives for curative consultations improved the treatment received.  
Curative care consultations are incentivized through PBF at 0.18(USD) per visit, while receipt of 
medications is incentivized through the quarterly quality assessment conducted for each PBF 
facility.  This assessment includes direct observation of 5 primary care consultations for children 
less than 5 years of age.  Points are awarded based on appropriate treatment per national 
protocol.
101
  Outpatient consultations are one of the least incentivized services yet the quality 
score is more influenced by treatment of children than by any other single item assessed.  Perhaps 
this design of the incentive is in recognition of the limited role played by providers in outreach 
for these clients but their critical role in treatment once they seek care.     
No PBF program effect was found for facility care-seeking either among those with 
diarrhea, fever and/or ARI, or just diarrhea and/or fever.  Rather, the control populations sought 
facility care at a higher rate in 2007 compared to 2005.   Living in a household with someone who 
has health insurance and being born in a health facility were associated with a higher probability 
of seeking facility care, which may be indicative of an underlying propensity to use the health 
system (Appendix A.4, A.5).  One could argue that these choice variables may be the cause of 
potential endogeneity, 
102
 however when the models were run without these choice variables, no 
difference in outcome was found.   
An alternate interpretation might be that the dramatic increase in health insurance in 
Rwanda increased economic access to services such as curative consultations and facility 
deliveries.  Mutuelles de Santé were developed in an effort to mobilize resources locally for 
health centers and to reduce the financial barriers and risks families faced with unexpected 
medical costs.  By 2007, an estimated 68% of households had at least one member covered by 
health insurance, 96% of these participated in a mutuelle.
14
 In a 2011 study by Saksena and 
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colleagues, the rate of curative consultations was 3-fold higher among those with health insurance 
compared to those without health insurance.
103
  Moreover, they report that poorer households 
were less likely to have health insurance compared to the wealthiest households.
103
  On a smaller 
scale, Dhillon and colleagues found a similar increase in patient visits once subsidies for 
mutuelles increased insurance coverage to near 100% in a rural community in Rwanda.
96
  
Interactions between insurance and PBF and insurance and wealth quintiles were tested but 
dropped due to insignificance.  Disentangling the effects of PBF from the rise of mutuelles is 
difficult but a promising area for future study.   
Children living in PBF districts were significantly and substantially more likely to receive 
medications and/or ORT when ill compared to children living in control districts.  This finding 
reinforces the notion put forward by Basinga and colleagues that those services that are within the 
control of the provider and less reliant on repeated initiation by the consumer, are more likely to 
improve under PBF.
61
  Huntington and colleagues also found an increase in medications received 
by sick children in pay-for-performance intervention sites in Egypt.
56
  Granted not all cases of 
diarrhea or fever require a medical intervention, however Boerma and colleagues found in a 
multi-country study that the treatment of sick children was the most underutilized service, 
measured as a 58.8 percentage point gap between the potential maximum treatment received and 
a country’s mean treatment received for the total population of sick children.41  Globally, 
universal coverage of oral rehydration therapy could prevent an estimated 15% of deaths under 
age 5, while antimalarials and treatment of pneumonia could prevent an additional 5% each.
16
  
Given the exceptionally low usage for antimalarials in Rwanda, 5.6% among children under five 
years, and the reported 39% ORT use, clearly improvements are needed.
14
  This study finding 
strongly indicates that the quality of childhood treatment improved significantly under PBF, 
despite the crudeness of the measure.   
The potential contamination of study findings by other interventions or health system 
changes is a challenge for impact evaluations, even with a randomized study design. The 
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difference-in-differences estimation strategy allows one to treat each community as its own 
control and the randomized intervention assignment creates a counterfactual for comparison.  But 
the strategy cannot control for an unobserved intervention or shock to the health system or 
community that affects only select communities during the period between the pre- and post-
measurement.  For example, if the President’s Malaria Initiative significantly increased the 
distribution of Artemisinin-based combination therapies (ACTs) for the treatment of malaria in 
select PBF districts in 2006 and not control districts, then absent information specific to ACT 
distribution, one is unable to control for that difference, hence biasing results in favor of PBF.  
The piloting of the Integrated Management of Childhood Illness (IMCI) in October 2006 is 
another example of potential bias.  IMCI was piloted in three PBF districts, one control district, 
and three pilot PBF districts that were not included in this study.  It is unclear whether the IMCI 
pilot had any effect on our findings.  The pilot evaluation reports that on average only one 
provider per site was trained in IMCI and insufficient results are blamed on competition with 
PBF.  Essentially the diagnostic and treatment algorithms for PBF are incentivized while those 
for IMCI are not specifically incentivized, such that providers may have been more inclined to 
follow PBF protocols rather than the piloted IMCI protocols vis-à-vis diagnosing and treatment 
offered.  
The challenges of using a randomized study design for a national program evaluation are 
clear.  Despite random assignment at baseline, it is virtually impossible to control for changes in 
the health system, either positive or negative, that affect some and not all sites uniformly.  Yet the 
cost savings realized when using routinely collected national population-based survey data makes 





Conclusions and Implications 
 
The overall objective of this dissertation was to determine the impact of PBF on equitable 
service utilization to meet the preventive and curative health care needs of women and children in 
Rwanda.  PBF is built on the premise that increased productivity and quality of primary maternal 
and child health services will improve the health of the population.  Rwanda’s PBF program was 
designed to increase the quantity of facility-based health services and to improve the quality of 
those services.  Given the prevailing low use of services across all segments of the population in 
Rwanda, particularly for facility deliveries, contraceptive use, and curative care consultations, 
PBF was adopted to improve universal access without specific provisions to target the poorest 
families.  As in most low and middle income countries, the poorest in the population typically use 
fewer formal health services.  Understanding the impact of a non-targeted health system financing 
program on the poorer households will help Rwanda, and other countries following its lead, 
ensure that the poorest and most vulnerable women and children are reached.   
In brief, these analyses found that the PBF program positively increased the probability 
of health service use for the most highly incentivized service, facility deliveries.  PBF was neither 
a pro-poor nor pro-rich strategy for increasing use of maternal or child health services studied.  
Moreover, no differential effect of PBF for woman’s health care was found in urban versus rural 
communities.  Regarding the quality of services, PBF was found to improve the probability of 
receiving medications among children whose caregivers sought a curative consultation for 
diarrhea and/or fever, and the data suggests improved benefits for the poorest children, although 
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the findings are inconclusive.  Following are suggested implications and methodological 
considerations from these two studies. 
 
Policy Implications 
Maternal and child health service use increased in both intervention and control groups 
from 2005 to 2007 for all services studied.  In just over two years, use of the four studied 
maternal services increased by 13-17 percentage points in the control districts and 8-26 
percentage points in the PBF districts.  Moreover, these improvements were realized across all 
wealth groups, with some narrowing of the equity gap.  Similar trends in service use were found 
for child consultations:  curative care visits among those with reported childhood illnesses 
increased across the board for children living in intervention and control districts, and for children 
from most wealth quintiles.  The improvement was more pronounced in control districts, where a 
7.8 percentage point improvement in care-seeking for diarrhea and/or fever was found.  However, 
the inequity in care-seeking remained constant over time for the intervention and control districts.   
These improvements in service use were in fact a continuation of a national trend started 
in 2000.
2
  The average effect of PBF, while substantial for facility deliveries, is negligible for 
other services given the increases seen overall.  Three national strategies likely underlie these 
improvements:  i) an increase in national health financing; ii) decentralization of the health 
system; and iii) a national increase in Mutuelle de Santé participation, or health insurance.   
Health expenditures in Rwanda increased substantially from 73 million USD in 2000 to 
301.6 million USD in 2006.
58
  In conjunction with this increase in funding, the authority and 
decision-making vis-à-vis the use of funds were largely handed over to district-level health 
authorities in the nationwide decentralization process.  In 2006, 30 new administrative districts 
were created.  The new administrative authorities were responsible for and had authority over 
health, education, and economic development activities in their districts.  These new district 
borders were drawn to include at least one hospital and to follow facility catchment boundaries as 
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closely as possible.  The increase in health expenditures and local autonomy benefited the scale-
up of PBF, although the benefits were not exclusive to intervention districts.  An equivalent 
amount of supplemental funding was provided to control districts during PBF scale-up, without 
any obligation to PBF.  The impact of these gross funding increases should not be discounted.     
Universal insurance coverage, most prominently accounted for by mutuelle participation, 
has been strongly encouraged by the government.  In 2006, the government began subsidizing 
insurance premiums for the poorest 25% of households and by 2008 established, although did not 
enforce, a national policy that required participation in some type of insurance plan.  By 2008, an 
estimated 85% of households in Rwanda had insurance.
104
  A typical mutuelle plan covers basic 
services including family planning, ANC visits, curative consultations, facility deliveries, 
laboratory work, generic medicines and some hospitalizations.  Mutuelles are designed to remove 
financial barriers to access and protect the insured against catastrophic health expenses.  In 
Rwanda, studies have reported a positive effect of insurance on use of maternal and child health 
services.
95, 96, 103, 105
  Saksena and colleagues, looking specifically at differential effects by wealth, 
found the impact of insurance on curative care use was higher among poorer households, 
suggesting that mutuelles may contribute to a narrowing of service inequity in Rwanda.
103
   
In this dissertation analysis, a woman or child from a household with insurance had a 
higher probability of seeking ANC in the first trimester, delivering in a facility, and seeking 
curative care when sick.  Yet no differential effect of PBF by insurance status was found for 
either maternal or child service use, nor when insurance was interacted with wealth.   At baseline, 
there was no difference between the proportion of intervention and control households reporting 
some insurance coverage.  At follow-up however, women and children living in intervention 
districts reported a significant increase in insurance participation, 25.8 and 13.2 percentage points 
respectively.  Meanwhile for women living in control districts the increase in insurance was only 
14.2 percentage points and for children, 4.1 percentage points.  One interpretation of this 
differential increase is that insurance enrollment was promoted more in PBF districts.  Health 
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facilities, recognizing the high financial cost to families for facility care, may have facilitated 
insurance enrollment to eliminate one barrier to delivering in a facility. However, running the 
models with and without the insurance covariate did not change the results, suggesting that the 
effect of PBF was not mediated by insurance uptake.  The synergistic effects of PBF and health 
insurance, particularly by wealth group, remain unclear.  Further analysis, stratified by wealth 
group, may help disentangle the effects of supply-side incentives and removal of demand-side 
barriers.  
Despite overall improvements in several of the service use outcomes studied, absence of 
measurable differences between intervention and control districts suggests a supply-side incentive 
is not adequate on its own to increase use, unless the incentive is large.  For ANC care, 
contraceptive use, and curative care consults, the smaller incentives do not compel providers or 
facilities to reach out to the community.   Offering a small incentive at minimum may protect 
against focusing all efforts on the most highly incentivized preventive services, although it would 
be useful to expand analysis to include non-incentivized services as well to provide a better 
picture of the potential effect.  What’s likely is that care-seeking for both preventive and curative 
care continues to rely on consumer’s perception and ability to access care.  A demand-side 
incentive or improvement in physical access (e.g., community health workers) or financial access 
(e.g., insurance) may have a stronger effect on seeking services at health facilities.  PBF may 
indeed have led to creative demand-side promotions, particularly for increased insurance 
participation and use of community outreach.  Following the national scale-up, additions to the 
PBF program have been suggested and implemented, including a formal incentive for 
community-based health workers who provide referrals and/or home services that fall under the 
umbrella of primary maternal and child care.  Understanding how this expansion influences care 
in the framework of service provision in Rwanda will be a valuable addition to the body of 
literature regarding PBF. 
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Findings regarding quality incentives in PBF provide a different narrative.  Among those 
who reported facility care-seeking for diarrhea and/or fever, the probability of receiving 
medication or ORT improved by 14.5 percentage points from 2005 to 2007 for those living in 
PBF districts; a stark contrast to the decrease in treatment received by those living in control 
districts.  This improvement resulted in a 26.3 percentage point average increase in treatment 
received among those living in PBF districts relative to those living in control districts.  
Furthermore, the data strongly suggest that the poorest in PBF districts benefitted more by the 
program relative to the least poor in PBF districts and those living in control districts.  Sick 
children from the three poorest quintiles in control districts actually suffered a 31-39 percentage 
point decline in medications and ORT received, while children from all wealth quintiles in PBF 
districts showed an increase in medications and ORT received.   The study sample does not 
provide adequate power to observe statistically significant effects of PBF by wealth, although the 
large estimates for the poorest two quintiles indicate improvements in treatment received of over 
40 percentage points compared to the least poor in the PBF districts and relative to the children in 
control districts. This data suggests that PBF positively influenced the treatment received during 
curative care visits and protected the services from the declines suffered by facilities in control 
districts.  Reasons for the decline in control district services is unclear, although further 
investigation into possible disruptions in supply of medicine or a shift in focus away from child 
care services may be revealing.  In intervention districts, the monthly quality assessments 
included a review of the pharmacy, which provided motivation to maintain an adequate supply of 
medicines and products. 
These findings about medical treatment rely on indicators that serve as crude measures of 
need and quality.  One could argue that not all reported cases of diarrhea and fever need medical 
intervention and if the incidence of malaria or dysentery has decreased since 2005, then the 
appropriate treatment may not be anti-malarials or antibiotics.  Bryce and colleagues, however, 
propose that certain thresholds of care and care-seeking need to be met at a population level in 
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order to reduce mortality.
17
  For diarrhea, appropriate management with ORT should exceed 50% 
while appropriate treatment for fever should exceed 60%.  Among the 2007 study population, 
only 38% received ORT among all those sick with diarrhea, yet 71% who sought facility care for 
diarrhea received ORT.  Bearing in mind potential selection bias due to sicker children seeking 
care, this almost doubling of the proportion of sick children who received ORT when visiting the 
health facility suggests that better treatment is provided when cases are evaluated by a health 
professional.  Among those with fever in 2007, less than 5% of reported cases were treated with 
anti-malarials while among those who sought facility care, 13% received anti-malarials, still far 
below the recommended 60% but an improvement.  Some of this discrepancy between 
recommended and actual uptake may be accounted for by improved diagnostics that identified 
fewer malaria cases, although even if malaria incidence has declined and testing has increased, a 
13% malaria treatment rate is low in a country where malaria remains one of the leading causes 
of childhood mortality.  The bottom line is that too few sick children in Rwanda are receiving the 
appropriate management for diarrhea and fever.  PBF is a promising practice for improving 
disease management at health facilities; however it hinges on increasing facility consultations. 
In the context of Rwanda, these evaluation findings support the hypothesis that 
incentivizing quality of care improves the quality provided.  Once a child needing care seeks 
consultation at a facility, then the care provided is an improvement over what would be received 
otherwise.  The incentive structure rewards the critical role providers play in assuring the quality 
of services provided.   
 
Programmatic Implications 
Looking beyond the Rwanda experience, the findings from this study should encourage 
other countries exploring or implementing PBF programs to consider the extent of inequity in 
service use.  If the level of service output and use is low across the board, then PBF may prove to 
be a valuable tool to address the inadequacy of quantity and quality of care.  It is important 
60 
 
however to design a PBF program with full recognition of the relative strengths and weaknesses 
of the system.  First, health care providers will have the most influence on the quality of care and 
treatment provided once someone seeks curative or preventive care at a facility.  Hence, 
prescribing the correct treatment or providing all immunizations and contraceptive choices to 
women and children is within the purview of the facility.  Incentivizing the quality of supplies 
and services should be a part of any supply-side PBF scheme.   
Recruiting women and children into care is more difficult to do without addressing 
demand-side constraints.  Consumer inputs designed to reduce financial barriers, such as 
insurance, or to increase demand through outreach and education by community health worker 
(CHW) programs, are necessary companion strategies to supply-side efforts.  While evidence 
supports the use of CHWs to increase childhood immunizations, reduce childhood morbidity and 
mortality from routine illness, and increase maternal care provided for ANC and family 
planning;
106, 107
 no rigorous evaluation of incentivizing CHWs has been published.  In a PBF 
scheme, CHWs could be incentivized to educate and refer the population to available primary 
maternal and child health care services.  Alternately, CHWs may be trained to provide some 
doorstep services for those families where travel prohibits or discourages facility care.  These 
services can cover basic ANC counseling, family planning education and resupply of 
contraceptives, or rapid testing and in-home treatment of childhood illnesses such as diarrhea, 
fever or ARI.  Implementing a network of CHWs requires comprehensive training in patient 
education, appropriate in-home services, and recognizing signs and symptoms for referral care.  
Moreover, controls need to be put in place to monitor the quality of this off-site work as well as 
the validity of reporting.  An evaluation of Rwanda’s experience with expanding PBF to CHWs 
would be a welcome addition to the evidence base for PBF. 
If a large gap exists between the poorest and least poor populations, then a uniform 
supply-side financing program described above will do little to close that gap, rather a targeted 
approach is needed.  Two targeting methods deserve consideration depending on the country 
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context.  First a geographic approach has been successful in countries where underserved 
populations are identifiable based on location, such as rural remote communities or poor, urban 
slums.
54, 108
  The PBF incentive structure can be designed to favor service provision in these 
poorer communities through higher incentives per service or combined with consumer vouchers 
to encourage use.   
A second promising method is the setting of performance targets specific to poorer 
families, such as the case in Cambodia which rewarded providers for documented improvement 
in immunization rates among the poorer half of the population.
109
   Setting differential 
performance targets would oblige health facilities to identify and track clients by wealth status, 
establish outreach efforts to recruit clients from poorer households, and reduce consumer barriers 
for these poorest families.  Ideally these efforts would build on existing programs that target the 
underserved.  For example in Rwanda the government subsidizes insurance premiums for the 
poorest 25% of the population.  This effort requires identification of the target population and 
tracking to assure appropriate receipt of the benefit.  An equity performance target could build on 
this project by incentivizing services provided to this population with subsidized insurance.  
Similarly, another program gaining traction in some countries is the issuance of identification 
cards for poor households, a government initiative to determine which households are poor and 
identify their level of poverty.  This information could be made available to agencies such as 
health facilities, in order to target services directly to these households.  Subsequently when 
services are used it allows for the tracking of care provided.   This approach would motivate 
providers to serve the poorer households, but may still require outreach and consumer incentives 
to motivate the poor to seek services. 
 
Methodological Issues 
There are some methodological issues from this evaluation that merit discussion.  
National program evaluations are challenging due to the uncontrolled and oftentimes 
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unpredictable influences of factors external to the intervention and the evaluation.  For example, 
environmental factors such as topographical variations that impede access to facilities in Rwanda 
or produce different environmental risk factors for illness due to water quality or population 
density may have an unmeasured effect on program implementation and uptake.  Confounding 
may also be introduced due to new program efforts launched during the period under evaluation.  
Lastly, rapid economic growth and improvements in health nationally may make it hard to 
identify progress attributable to one specific program.  Without appropriate measurement and 
control for these changes, confounding may bias evaluation findings.
110
   
Fortunately the scale-up of PBF in Rwanda followed a stepped-wedge design,
111
 wherein 
PBF was introduced in a phased approach with random assignment to early and late 
implementation phases.  Matching districts on rainfall, density, and livelihood, prior to random 
PBF assignment provided an opportunity to control for the environmental and socio-economic 
characteristics of these communities that might influence health outcomes.  Econometric 
techniques were employed to control for potential additional unobserved time-invariant 
confounders such as community infrastructure or educational opportunities.  Potential bias 
remains, however, if unmeasured shocks to the health system occurred for some and not all study 
districts, particularly if an intervention was targeted to build on the new PBF system.  For 
example, if the President’s Malaria Initiative substantially increased the availability of ACTs for 
the treatment of malaria in intervention districts only, perhaps due to a perception by donors of 
better pharmaceutical supply chains in these districts, then results may be biased.  If on the other 
hand, the facilities in PBF districts were better positioned to maximize the use of the increased 
availability of anti-malarials, then the improvements in malaria treatment due to PBF may be 
overstated, suggesting a stronger effect of PBF than warranted.  While these scenarios may 
confound program effects, the alternative of withholding all other interventions or improvements 
over the duration of a study is impractical and unethical given the multiple health challenges 
faced in developing countries.  Researchers instead need to maximize opportunities for 
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evaluation, such as was done with the stepped-wedge design, and collect or use available data that 
improves the ability to control for confounders as much as possible. 
The second consideration is the data sources used for national program evaluations.  
Oftentimes, evaluations of facility interventions rely on service use data from health information 
systems or population-based survey data collected specifically for evaluation of the program in 
question.  There are advantages and limitations to both:  measurement of program inputs per 
facility and outputs per individual tied to a specific facility are possible with routine systems and 
surveys, yet incentivized reporting may confound program outputs and surveys are expensive.  
Using existing national data has advantages and limitations as well.  In the case of Rwanda, two 
DHS studies book-ending the implementation period for initial program roll-out, with the same 
clusters sampled, provided a unique opportunity to look at data longitudinally.  The random 
assignment at the district level, allowed for aggregating data across intervention and control 
districts, thereby reducing concern that district-specific data alone was not adequate to draw  
population-level conclusions.  Most importantly, in a country facing competing financial 
priorities, using existing DHS data for evaluation purposes is cost-effective and maximizes the 
resource input that Rwanda already made to gather and produce nationally representative 
datasets.  The primary limitation is the inability to link the study population to the specific facility 
used for health care received, as specific facility data is not collected in the RDHS.  Instead the 
study populations and health facilities were assigned intervention and control status based on 
their location within an administrative district.  The two primary assumptions are that individuals 
use facilities within their residential district and all facilities within a district converted 
successfully to PBF.  Future work assessing the potential measurement error introduced due to 
varying methods of linking communities to facilities may shed light on better techniques to 






Rwanda has produced remarkable results from their efforts to improve maternal and child 
health service utilization over the past several years, including progress in reducing the equity 
gap.  Studying these efforts provides some insights into what works and doesn’t work in Rwanda 
and what may be successfully replicated elsewhere.  Countries across sub-Saharan Africa are 
implementing new PBF-style financing strategies in an effort to improve health services.  
Understanding the provider’s role and scope of influence vis-à-vis access and quality will inform 
policy makers in how best to advocate for and implement change.  Implications from this research 
suggest that demand-side and supply-side incentives are needed to increase use of services and 
improve the quality of those services.  Moreover, if service use is uniformly low then a PBF 
program that has standard performance targets, particularly for services that are well reimbursed, 
such as facility deliveries, may improve service use overall.  However if the equity gap is extreme 
or service use is sub-optimal among the poorer populations, then a non-targeted PBF program 
like Rwanda’s will likely do little to alleviate disparities.  Complementary efforts that address 
demand-side barriers, such as health insurance, waived fees, or voucher schemes, may result in an 






Table A.1.  Output indicators and quality weights used to determine performance-based financing 
payments 
Output Indicators – payment per unit Payment Quality of Services Weight 
 Visit and Outreach Indicators (USD) General Administration 0.052 
Curative care visits 0.18 Cleanliness 0.028 
1
st
 prenatal care visits 0.09 Curative care 0.170 
4 completed ANC visits 0.37 Delivery 0.130 
1
st
 time family planning visits (new users) 1.83 Prenatal Care 0.126 
One-month contraceptive resupply 0.18 Family Planning 0.114 
Facility delivery 4.59 Immunizations 0.070 
Child (0-59 months) growth monitoring visits 0.18 Growth Monitoring 0.520 
Completed childhood vaccines on time 0.92 HIV Services 0.090 
 Content of Care Indicators  TB Services 0.028 
Appropriate tetanus vaccine during ANC 0.46 Lab Services 0.030 
2
nd
 does of malaria prophylaxis during ANC 0.46 Pharmacy Management 0.060 
At-risk pregnancies referred to hospital for delivery  1.83 Financial Management 0.050 
Emergency transfers to hospitals for obstetric care  4.59   
Malnourished children referred for treatment  1.83   






Table A.2. Linear probability models for effect of PBF on maternal health service use, with and without community fixed effects  
 



















Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) 
Year 2007 0.144*** 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.136*** 0.170*** 0.169*** 0.148*** 0.148*** 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.033) (0.033) (0.017) (0.017) 
















 2007 * PBF District 0.004 0.011 -0.052 -0.053 0.090* 0.100* 0.009 0.010 
 
(0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.039) (0.040) (0.022) (0.022) 
Wealth (Ref: Least Poor) 
        Poorest -0.016 0.006 -0.055 -0.035 -0.120*** -0.091* -0.069** -0.060* 
 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.036) (0.021) (0.023) 
Poorer -0.012 -0.008 -0.027 -0.030 -0.090** -0.073* -0.081*** -0.073*** 
 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.036) (0.020) (0.022) 
Middle -0.023 -0.013 -0.044 -0.029 -0.060 -0.041 -0.074*** -0.068*** 
 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.019) (0.019) 
Less Poor -0.017 -0.011 -0.022 -0.017 -0.075* -0.072* -0.041* -0.037 
 
(0.028) (0.029) (0.033) (0.033) (0.031) (0.032) (0.020) (0.021) 
















 Age -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Education (Ref: No School) 
Primary School 0.002 -0.005 0.010 -0.005 0.048* 0.042 0.033** 0.028* 
 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.012) (0.012) 






(0.042) (0.045) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.026) (0.027) 
Married 0.047* 0.059* 0.072** 0.079** 0.026 0.049 
  
 
(0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.027) (0.029) 
  Parity (Ref: ≥ 5 Births) 
        1 Birth 0.085* 0.088* 0.077 0.072 0.426*** 0.404*** 0.131*** 0.134*** 
 
(0.035) (0.036) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.041) (0.017) (0.018) 
2-4 Births 0.026 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.053 0.046 0.255*** 0.253*** 
 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.019) (0.021) 
 ≥ 5 Births (Ref: No Births) 
     
0.327*** 0.328*** 
       
(0.023) (0.024) 
Health Insurance 0.037* 0.038* 0.021 0.028 0.058** 0.055* 0.016 0.008 
 
(0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.011) (0.012) 
Prior Facility Delivery 0.006 -0.003 0.065* 0.053 0.402*** 0.367*** -0.055** -0.053** 
 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) (0.017) (0.017) 
Any ANC Visits 
    
0.202*** 0.192*** 
  
     
(0.030) (0.035) 
  Prior Child Death 
      
-0.075*** -0.074*** 
       
(0.014) (0.014) 
Constant 0.051 0.001 0.003 0.038 -0.102 -0.155 0.094* 0.069* 
  (0.073) (0.073) (0.094) (0.089) (0.092) (0.097) (0.039) (0.033) 
Number of Clusters 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
Number of Women 1983 1983 1983 1983 1977 1977 4050 4050 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 







Table A.3.  Linear probability models with community fixed effects for effect of PBF on maternal health service use, differentiated by wealth and 
stratified by residence  
 
Early ANC Initiation Four or more ANC Visits Facility Delivery Modern Contraception 
 


























Year 2007 0.148** 0.099 0.228* 0.212*** 0.211** 0.213 0.107 0.159 0.016 0.169*** 0.169** 0.227* 
 
(0.056) (0.061) (0.105) (0.059) (0.072) (0.119) (0.064) (0.101) (0.051) (0.044) (0.053) (0.081) 
2007 * PBF District 0.024 0.098 -0.030 -0.150 -0.135 -0.043 0.070 0.050 0.155 -0.033 -0.060 0.008 
 
(0.082) (0.089) (0.156) (0.084) (0.099) (0.153) (0.083) (0.118) (0.116) (0.056) (0.070) (0.098) 
2007 * PBF  -0.062 -0.147 0.012 0.091 0.087 -0.069 -0.040 -0.018 0.096 0.058 0.082 -0.031 
 * Poorest   (0.104) (0.111) (0.304) (0.103) (0.121) (0.242) (0.119) (0.148) (0.300) (0.072) (0.083) (0.181) 
2007 * PBF -0.097 -0.178 0.014 0.048 0.080 -0.642 0.102 0.122 0.022 0.022 0.034 0.054 
  * Poorer (0.113) (0.122) (0.327) (0.122) (0.138) (0.327) (0.114) (0.143) (0.337) (0.072) (0.084) (0.196) 
2007 * PBF 0.029 0.071 -0.573* 0.197 0.224 -0.277 0.045 0.081 -0.012 0.088 0.114 0.073 
  * Middle (0.106) (0.115) (0.254) (0.119) (0.129) (0.298) (0.112) (0.151) (0.189) (0.075) (0.086) (0.190) 
2007 * PBF   0.051 -0.027 0.167 0.139 0.108 0.290 0.020 0.108 -0.379 0.056 0.089 0.009 
  * Less Poor (0.117) (0.129) (0.212) (0.112) (0.124) (0.259) (0.123) (0.152) (0.231) (0.073) (0.088) (0.146) 
2007 * Poorest 0.044 0.107 0.075 -0.111 -0.084 -0.104 0.135 0.071 0.390* -0.048 -0.046 -0.131 
 
(0.070) (0.078) (0.220) (0.077) (0.094) (0.148) (0.090) (0.122) (0.148) (0.055) (0.065) (0.120) 
2007 * Poorer 0.030 0.093 -0.143 -0.076 -0.086 0.000 0.009 -0.030 0.113 -0.006 0.012 -0.045 
 
(0.087) (0.095) (0.169) (0.093) (0.107) (0.185) (0.086) (0.118) (0.154) (0.057) (0.064) (0.120) 
2007 * Middle -0.040 -0.055 0.124 -0.097 -0.100 0.000 0.142 0.093 0.245* -0.058 -0.052 -0.159 
 
(0.074) (0.083) (0.158) (0.090) (0.095) (0.222) (0.092) (0.132) (0.093) (0.059) (0.066) (0.148) 
2007 * Less Poor -0.062 0.009 -0.249 -0.102 -0.070 -0.258 0.035 -0.051 0.313 -0.010 -0.010 -0.061 
 
(0.087) (0.097) (0.135) (0.086) (0.094) (0.201) (0.091) (0.119) (0.170) (0.055) (0.066) (0.085) 
Wealth (Ref: Least Poor) 
           Poorest -0.017 -0.039 -0.059 -0.004 0.035 -0.180 -0.158* -0.166* -0.380* -0.033 -0.019 -0.117 
 





Poorer 0.007 -0.034 0.121 -0.016 0.008 -0.090 -0.088 -0.090 -0.251 -0.068* -0.056 -0.211** 
 
(0.051) (0.055) (0.112) (0.062) (0.073) (0.104) (0.066) (0.083) (0.136) (0.033) (0.035) (0.065) 
Middle 0.014 -0.008 0.006 0.037 0.062 -0.041 -0.119 -0.157 -0.126 -0.043 -0.039 -0.104 
 
(0.045) (0.055) (0.071) (0.062) (0.073) (0.098) (0.065) (0.085) (0.125) (0.034) (0.036) (0.104) 
Less Poor 0.035 0.005 0.076 0.021 0.051 -0.054 -0.069 -0.061 -0.243 -0.050 -0.022 -0.225*** 
 

















  Education (Ref: No School) 
































  Married 0.059* 0.047 0.136 0.080** 0.077** 0.126 0.050 
     
 
(0.024) (0.027) (0.071) (0.026) (0.029) (0.083) (0.029) 
     Parity (Ref: ≥ 5 Births) 
           1 Birth 0.086* 0.076** 0.110 0.070 0.042 0.036 0.408*** 0.372*** 0.450*** 0.134*** 0.120*** 0.187* 
 
(0.037) (0.026) (0.065) (0.040) (0.026) (0.069) (0.041) (0.028) (0.062) (0.018) (0.017) (0.072) 














(0.021) (0.016) (0.056) 
 ≥ 5 Births (Ref: No Births) 
        
0.329*** 0.166*** 0.253*** 
          
(0.024) (0.014) (0.059) 





(0.018) (0.018) (0.054) (0.019) (0.022) (0.046) (0.022) 
  
(0.012) 











(0.029) (0.031) (0.074) (0.017) 
  Any ANC Visits 
      
0.193*** 0.197*** 0.254* 
   
       
(0.036) (0.042) (0.090) 





Prior Child Death 
         
-0.075*** 
  
          
(0.014) 
  Constant -0.004 0.027 -0.126 0.024 0.049 -0.013 -0.114 0.065 0.092 0.068* -0.037 -0.070 
  (0.075) (0.039) (0.090) (0.092) (0.048) (0.107) (0.096) (0.053) (0.070) (0.034) (0.025) (0.066) 
Number of Clusters 150 128 22 150 128 22 150 128 22 150 128 22 
Number of Women 1983 1733 302 1983 1733 302 1977 1682 296 4050 3586 535 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
        Note:  Coefficients for PBF*Poorest (Poorer, Middle, Less Poor) not included in table 






Table A.4. Linear probability models for effect of PBF on reported diarrhea, fever and/or 
symptoms of ARI, and facility care-seeking, differentiated by wealth 
 














Coeff  (SE) Coeff  (SE) Coeff  (SE) 
 
Coeff  (SE) Coeff  (SE)    Coeff  (SE) 
Year 2007 0.023 0.020 0.068 
 
0.078* 0.070* 0.193* 
 
(0.034) (0.034) (0.042) 
 
(0.032) (0.033) (0.084) 
PBF District 0.017 





   
(0.031) 
  2007 * PBF District -0.033 -0.034 -0.102 
 
-0.042 -0.042 -0.223* 
 
(0.041) (0.041) (0.063) 
 
(0.045) (0.046) (0.107) 
2007 * PBF * Poorest 
  
0.054 
   
0.203 
   
(0.084) 
   
(0.142) 
2007 * PBF * Poorer 
  
0.110 
   
0.194 
   
(0.094) 
   
(0.141) 
2007 * PBF * Middle 
  
0.136 
   
0.291* 
   
(0.082) 
   
(0.147) 
2007 * PBF *  
  
0.046 
   
0.198 
     Less  Poor 
  
(0.083) 
   
(0.137) 
2007 * Poorest 
  
-0.079 
   
-0.143 
   
(0.055) 
   
(0.111) 
2007 *  Poorer 
  
-0.068 
   
-0.183 
   
(0.068) 
   
(0.110) 
2007 *  Middle 
  
-0.114 
   
-0.208 
   
(0.060) 
   
(0.115) 
2007 * Less Poor 
  
-0.004 
   
-0.088 
   
(0.058) 
   
(0.110) 
Wealth (Ref.Group: Least Poor) 
      Poorest 0.009 0.010 0.029 
 
-0.150*** -0.144** -0.147 
 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.047) 
 
(0.041) (0.046) (0.078) 
   Poorer 0.038 0.038 0.030 
 
-0.134*** -0.119** -0.074 
 
(0.027) (0.028) (0.058) 
 
(0.040) (0.045) (0.077) 
Middle 0.049* 0.050* 0.102 
 
-0.094** -0.089* -0.017 
 
(0.024) (0.023) (0.052) 
 
(0.035) (0.037) (0.078) 
Less Poor 0.042* 0.040 0.008 
 
-0.092* -0.084* -0.096 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.034) 
 
(0.037) (0.038) (0.080) 
Rural Residence 0.003 





   
(0.032) 
  Health Insurance 
    
0.168*** 0.145*** 0.148*** 
     
(0.022) (0.024) (0.024) 
 
Child's Age (Ref: 0-11 months) 
      
72 
 
12-23 months 0.082*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 
 
-0.017 -0.021 -0.021 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) 
 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) 
24-35 months -0.045* -0.043* -0.043* 
 
-0.024 -0.021 -0.020 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
 
(0.032) (0.033) (0.033) 
36-47 months -0.084*** -0.081*** -0.081*** 
 
-0.067* -0.075* -0.076* 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
 
(0.033) (0.032) (0.032) 
48-59 months -0.129*** -0.127*** -0.127*** 
 
-0.126*** -0.127*** -0.131*** 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
 
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036) 
Birth Order (Ref: 5th or higher) 
      First -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 
 
0.048 0.059 0.053 
 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
 
(0.048) (0.049) (0.048) 
Second-Fourth -0.034 -0.034 -0.033 
 
0.027 0.024 0.022 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
 
(0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
Child's Sex: Boy 0.004  0.003  0.003  
 
0.001  0.007  0.007  
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Born in Health 
Facility -0.009 -0.003 -0.002 
 
0.113*** 0.096*** 0.098*** 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
Mother's Age -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 
0.001 0.002 0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Mother's Education (Ref: No School) 
      Primary School -0.032 -0.030 -0.030 
 
-0.007 -0.011 -0.012 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
 
(0.025) (0.026) (0.027) 
 Secondary School 0.002 0.004 0.007 
 
0.111* 0.125* 0.134* 
 
(0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
 
(0.051) (0.054) (0.055) 
Mother Married -0.041* -0.043* -0.043* 
 
-0.063* -0.064* -0.063 
 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
 
(0.029) (0.032) (0.032) 
Improved Toilet 
Facility 0.010 0.008 0.015 
    
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
    Clean Water Source -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 
    
 
(0.022) (0.024) (0.025) 
    Slept under bednet -0.002 0.002 0.001 
    
 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
    Previous Child Death 
    
0.002 0.004 0.002 
     
(0.026) (0.027) (0.028) 
Constant 0.521*** 0.530*** 0.520*** 
 
0.165 0.255* 0.242* 
  (0.064) (0.065) (0.070) 
 
(0.103) (0.106) (0.109) 
Number of Clusters 150 150 150   150 150 150 
Number of Children 5577 5577 5577   2020 2020 2020 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 




Table A.5.  Linear probability models for effect of PBF on reported on reported diarrhea and/or 
fever, and care-seeking, differentiated by wealth 
 














  Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) 
Year 2007 -0.018 -0.020 0.013 0.081* 0.078* 0.136 
 
(0.031) (0.032) (0.041) (0.033) (0.035) (0.089) 








  2007 * PBF District -0.021 -0.021 -0.081 -0.022 -0.030 -0.164 
 
(0.037) (0.037) (0.059) (0.047) (0.049) (0.117) 








































































Poorest 0.005 0.005 0.006 -0.123** -0.117* -0.187* 
 
(0.025) (0.026) (0.045) (0.043) (0.049) (0.083) 
Poorer 0.009 0.007 0.029 -0.105* -0.087 -0.130 
 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.056) (0.042) (0.047) (0.080) 
Middle 0.042 0.041 0.078 -0.071* -0.065 -0.041 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.051) (0.035) (0.038) (0.080) 
Less Poor 0.034 0.030 0.003 -0.074 -0.060 -0.143 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.079) 








  Health Insurance 
   
0.174*** 0.144*** 0.146*** 
    
(0.024) (0.026) (0.026) 
Child's Age (Ref: 0-11 months) 
     12-23 months 0.083 0.086***  0.086*** -0.019 -0.015 -0.013 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) 
74 
 
24-35 months -0.036 -0.034 -0.035 -0.004 0.008 0.008 
 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
36-47 months -0.083 -0.081***  -0.081*** -0.057 -0.063 -0.062 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) 
48-59 months -0.124 -0.122***  -0.123*** -0.116** -0.102* -0.103** 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039) 
Birth Order (Ref: 5th or higher) 
     First -0.025 -0.023 -0.021 0.049 0.055 0.044 
 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.050) (0.052) (0.051) 
Second-Fourth -0.028 -0.026 -0.025 0.025 0.019 0.015 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) 
Child's Sex: Boy 0.014 0.013 0.012 -0.011 -0.005 -0.005 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
Born in Health Facility -0.005 0.001 0.002 0.110*** 0.096*** 0.094*** 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028) 
Mother's Age -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Mother's Education (Ref: No School) 
      Primary School -0.031 -0.029 -0.029 -0.004 -0.011 -0.010 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) 
  Secondary School -0.056 -0.053 -0.052 0.151** 0.161** 0.174** 
 
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.054) (0.058) (0.057) 
Mother Married -0.037  -0.040*  -0.040* -0.063* -0.055 -0.057 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.032) (0.035) (0.036) 
Improved Toilet 0.004 0.003 0.008 
   
 
(0.016) -0.016 -0.017 
   Clean Water Source -0.013 (0.013) (0.015) 
   
 
(0.020) -0.022 -0.022 
   Slept under bednet 0.009 0.011 0.011 
   
 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
   Previous Child Death 
   
0.012 0.014 0.010 
    
(0.029) (0.031) (0.031) 
Constant  0.442***  0.447*** 0.442*** 0.145 0.237* 0.251* 
  (0.061) (0.061) (0.066) (0.110) (0.112) (0.114) 
Number of Clusters 150 150 150 150 150 150 
Number of Children 5577 5577 5577 1714 1714 1714 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 




Table A.6.   Linear probability models for effect of PBF on treatment received for diarrhea and/or 




DD Model DD with FE DDD with FE 
 
Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) Coeff (SE) 
Year 2007 -0.062 -0.118 -0.052 
 
(0.065) (0.076) (0.134) 







2007 * PBF District 0.155 0.263** 0.168 
 
(0.082) (0.093) (0.178) 
2007 * PBF * Poorest 
  
0.427 
   
(0.328) 
2007 * PBF * Poorer 
  
0.478 
   
(0.307) 
2007 * PBF * Middle 
  
0.272 
   
(0.246) 
2007 * PBF * Less Poor 
  
-0.109 
   
(0.306) 
2007 * Poorest 
  
-0.336 
   
(0.236) 
2007 *  Poorer 
  
-0.305 
   
(0.209) 
2007 *  Middle 
  
-0.259 
   
(0.167) 
 2007 * Less Poor 
  
0.055 
   
(0.246) 
Poorest -0.099 -0.116 0.382 
 
(0.068) (0.075) (0.216) 
Poorer -0.136 -0.207* -0.028 
 
(0.070) (0.082) (0.158) 
Middle -0.017 -0.038 0.093 
 
(0.058) (0.059) (0.145) 
Less Poor -0.059 -0.108 -0.013 
 
(0.059) (0.063) (0.191) 







Health Insurance -0.053 -0.078 -0.083 
 
(0.050) (0.057) (0.057) 
Child’s Age 
  
12-23 months -0.002 -0.028 -0.026 
 
(0.051) (0.058) (0.059) 
76 
 
24-35 months 0.013 -0.011 -0.021 
 
(0.062) (0.066) (0.067) 
36-47 months -0.035 -0.068 -0.067 
 
(0.066) (0.069) (0.066) 
48-59 months -0.151 -0.142 -0.134 
 
(0.094) (0.100) (0.097) 
Birth Order (Ref: 5th or higher) 
 
 
First 0.234* 0.238* 0.249* 
 
(0.096) (0.112) (0.116) 
Second-Fourth 0.202** 0.208** 0.216** 
 
(0.063) (0.073) (0.075) 
Child's Sex: Boy 0.014 0.041 0.043 
 
(0.045) (0.050) (0.051) 
Born in Health Facility 0.037 -0.016 -0.014 
 
(0.047) (0.052) (0.053) 
Mother's Age 0.012** 0.012* 0.012* 
 




  Primary School 0.021 0.013 0.004 
 
(0.057) (0.064) (0.066) 
  Secondary School 0.019 0.042 0.044 
 
(0.091) (0.106) (0.108) 
Mother Married 0.069 0.082 0.085 
 
(0.066) (0.070) (0.069) 
Previous Child Death 0.151** 0.149** 0.148* 
 
(0.049) (0.055) (0.059) 
Constant 0.103 0.171 0.140 
  (0.208) (0.220) (0.231) 
Number of Clusters 131 131 131 
Number of Children 499 499 499 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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